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“AN ANESTHESIOLOGIST, A BRAIN SURGEON, AND A
NURSE WALK INTO A BAR . . .” : A CALL FOR CHANGE IN
HOW AMERICA HANDLES HEALTH CARE WORKER
SUBSTANCE ABUSE
Angelica Halat*
I. INTRODUCTION
President Richard Nixon waged the War on Drugs in 1971.1 Forty
years later, the war continues, but the arena has evolved—the
battlefield, once confined to streets, jails, and disreputable nightclubs,
now includes the workplace. Since the introduction of President
Reagan’s Drug-Free Federal Workplace Act of 1986,2 public and private
employers have been subjecting seasonal clerical assistants,
commercial aircraft pilots, and countless workers in between to drug
and alcohol testing as a condition of employment. In fact, American
employees have become so accustomed to the practice that it is now as
commonplace as filling out the job application itself.3 It is surprising,
then, that a country so quick to administer drug tests leaves out the
one group of professionals that we, quite literally, entrust with our
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1
Ed Vulliamy, Nixon’s ‘War on Drugs’ Began 40 Years Ago, and the Battle is Still
Raging, THE GUARDIAN (July 23, 2011, 7:07 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
society/2011/jul/24/war-on-drugs-40-years.
2
Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32889 (Sept. 15, 1986),
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12564.html.
The Act required federal employees to refrain from using illegal drugs and directed
executive agencies to create and implement a plan to ensure a drug-free workplace. It
also authorized each agency to create a drug testing program for “employees in
sensitive positions” based on a reasonable suspicion, following an accident, and as part
of, or following, rehabilitative treatment. Id. § 3(a).
3
M. R. Levine & W. P. Rennie, Pre-Employment Urine Drug Testing of Hospital
Employees: Future Questions and Review of Current Literature, OCCUP. ENVIRON. MED., Apr.
2004, at 318, 318, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1740763/
pdf/v061p00318.pdf (discussing how common workplace drug testing has become in
America, and noting that “more than 90% of US companies with over 500 employees
have some sort of drug screening programme in place”).
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lives: health care workers.
For years, voices from all sectors of society, including the medical
field itself,4 have pushed for the testing of health care workers. These
calls for help have even motivated legislative attempts to mandate
testing. In 2013, a group of New Hampshire State Representatives
introduced HB-597 to require health care facilities to randomly test all
health care employees at least four times per year.5 The story of David
Kwiatkowski, a hospital technician, represents the most drastic flaws in
how our current health care system handles drug and alcohol abuse by
physicians,6 and spurred lawmakers to propose the bill.7 After
Kwiatkowski infected thirty-two people in New Hampshire with
Hepatitis-C in the course of feeding his addiction,8 the New Hampshire
Legislature attempted to nudge the medical field in the right direction
by introducing a bill that would have required hospitals to enact and
implement random drug testing policies.9
On the other side of the country, California’s Proposition 46
made headlines as potentially the first law to mandate random drug
and alcohol testing for state-licensed physicians.10 The testing
provision, part of a broader effort to raise the state’s medical
malpractice liability cap, proposed to test professionals according to a
drug testing program used by employers regulated by the U.S.
Department of Transportation (DOT).11 While the proposition failed,
Californians supported the drug testing portion of Proposition 46 both
4

See, e.g., Arthur L. Caplan, Doctors and Nurses Should Be Drug-Tested—Get Used to
It, MEDSCAPE (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/808385.
5
H.B. 597, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2013) [hereinafter HB-597].
6
Mark A. Abramson et al., Exposing The ‘Dirty Little Secret’: Random Drug Testing of
Health Care Workers in the Wake of the Hepatitis C Outbreak, NEW HAMPSHIRE BAR J.,
Spring/Summer 2014, at 10.
7
Aaron Sanborn, Random Drug Testing Taken Out of Hepatitis C Bill,
SEACOASTONLINE.COM (Nov. 5, 2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.seacoastonline.com/
article/20131105/News/311050336.
8
Abramson et al., supra note 6 (explaining that Kwiatkowski, fueled by his
fentanyl addiction, would inject himself with the fentanyl meant for patients, refill the
used syringes with saline, and then leave the syringes to be used on patients later).
9
HB-597, supra note 5. Although New Hampshire successfully enacted
legislation mandating that hospitals create drug testing policies, the statute does not
require random drug testing, as HB-597 did. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:41
(LexisNexis 2015).
10
SEC’Y OF STATE OF CAL., TEXT OF PROPOSED LAWS 46 (2014),
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/pdf/text-of-proposed-laws1.pdf#prop46
[hereinafter Proposition 46]; California Proposition 46, Medical Malpractice Lawsuits Cap
and Drug Testing of Doctors (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/California_
Proposition_46,_Medical_Malpractice_Lawsuits_Cap_and_Drug_Testing_of_Doctors
_(2014) (last visited Feb. 1, 2016).
11
Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.10; see 49 C.F.R. § 40 (2016).
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before12 and after the November elections,13 although many fiercely
debated its constitutionality. For example, Natasha Minsker, the
Associate Director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern
California, argued that the testing program was unconstitutional and
went “too far” by threatening to take away a doctor’s medical license
for failing a test.14 On the other hand, advocacy group Consumer
Watchdog argued that doctors are within the class of employees that
may constitutionally be tested,15 and that Proposition 46 is a
constitutional method of doing so.16
After its turn at the polls in November 2014, Proposition 46 failed
to become law, with sixty-seven percent of voters opposing it.17 Still,
many believe the testing policy itself was not to blame: the chief
executive of the California Medical Association, Dustin Corcoran, who
also served as the chairman of the campaign against the initiative,
stated of its failure: “in this health care environment, undermining
California’s long-standing malpractice cap is a political poison pill.”18
Further, because the testing mandate was allegedly included in the

12

Press Release, University of Southern California, USC Dornsife/L.A. Times Poll:
Support for Prop. 46 Drops Steeply as Voters Hear Initiative Details (Sept. 15, 2014),
https://pressroom.usc.edu/usc-dornsifela-times-poll-support-for-prop-46-dropssteeply-as-voters-hear-initiative-details/ [hereinafter USC Press Release] (explaining
that a September 2014 poll conducted by USC Dornsife and the Los Angeles Times
revealed that Proposition 46’s testing mandate was the most popular of the suggested
measures, with seventy percent of those polled in support of the idea).
13
Chris Kardish, California Won’t Drug Test Doctors, GOVERNING (Nov. 5, 2014),
http://www.governing.com/topics/elections/gov-california-medical-malpracticedoctors-drug-testing-ballot.html (reporting that while they disagreed with the
proposition as written, “[t]he American Civil Liberties Union and California’s biggest
doctor lobby didn’t completely dismiss the idea of drug testing doctors”).
14
Christopher Cadelago, Doctor Drug Testing Latest Front in Medical Malpractice
Measure, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 21, 2014, 9:16 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/news/
politics-government/election/article2607425.html; Sam Levin, The Poison Pill of
Proposition 46?, EAST BAY EXPRESS (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.eastbayexpress.com/
oakland/the-poison-pill-of-proposition-46/Content?oid=4079871.
15
Press Release, Consumer Watchdog, Consumer Watchdog Campaign: Prop 46
Author Calls on ACLU to Explain Why It Says Doctors Are Not in Safety Sensitive
Positions
&
Should
Not
Be
Tested
(Aug.
26,
2014),
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/consumer-watchdog-campaignprop-46-author-calls-aclu-explain-why-it-says-doctors-are-not.
16
Cadelago, supra note 14.
17
Michael F. Haverluck, Did CA Keep Costs Low by Voting Down Raising Malpractice
Cap?, ONENEWSNOW (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.onenewsnow.com/legalcourts/2014/11/15/did-ca-keep-costs-low-by-voting-down-raising-malpracticecap#.VKAm8DDDs.
18
Michael R. Blood, Attempt to Raise Medical Malpractice Cap Defeated, WASH. TIMES
(Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/nov/5/initiativewould-raise-medical-malpractice-cap/?page=all.

HALAT (DO NOT DELETE)

942

3/17/2016 12:55 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:939

initiative as a “‘sweetener’ designed to get voters to approve raising
[Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act] caps, which would be less
likely to win on its own,”19 it is difficult to ascertain how many voters
actually supported the testing provision itself.
On the other hand, it is quite clear that drug testing was the
problem in New Hampshire’s HB-597, which originally called for the
random testing of every health care worker in the state at least four
times per year.20 The state legislators ultimately decided to replace the
random test provision with a more politically pleasing substitute:
testing based on the nebulous “reasonable suspicion.”21 Based on these
legislative calls for change, as well as the support from various sectors,
it seems as though the idea of drug testing physicians in fact carries
much weight. The question, then, is: why have we not yet implemented
a program to drug test health care workers? Opponents claim that
drug testing is ineffective and invades personal privacy,22 but those
arguments would also seem to apply to pilots, teachers, and clerical
assistants, all of whom are subject to testing.23
Opposition to drug testing largely relies on constitutional, ethical,
and financial arguments. The constitutionality of drug testing
physicians, however, is no different than the constitutionality of drug
testing other employees carrying out safety-sensitive tasks. If it is
ethically acceptable to test bus drivers24 despite the supposed flaws in
drug testing,25 it is undoubtedly just as acceptable to test health care
workers for drug and/or alcohol impairment. Additionally, while drug
testing may increase operating expenses for medical professionals,
testing is worth the added cost for two reasons: not only is testing

19

Yul D. Ejnes, California’s Proposition 46 and Mandatory Physician Drug Testing: A
Cause for Concern, ANNALS INTERNAL MED., Dec. 16, 2014, at 911, 911.
20
HB-597, supra note 5; see also Sanborn, supra note 7 (explaining that since its
introduction, organizations such as the New Hampshire Association of Counties
opposed HB-597 because “mandatory random drug testing would have a significant
cost to the state’s [eleven] nursing homes and three assisted-living facilities”).
21
Abramson et al., supra note 6, at 14; see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 151:41
(LexisNexis 2015). Based on the elimination of the random testing provision, it seems
that HB-597 was also a victim of politics.
22
See Brandon Cohen, Drug-Test Physicians? Docs Say ‘No Way’, MEDSCAPE (Aug. 26,
2014), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/830211.
23
See infra Part IV.
24
49 C.F.R. § 382.103(a) (2016) (explaining that all “persons who operate a
commercial motor vehicle in commerce in any State” are subject to drug testing).
25
Kristina Fiore, APA: Drug Test Results Often Flawed, MEDPAGE TODAY (May 23,
2010), http://www.medpagetoday.com/MeetingCoverage/APA/20253 (noting that
one in twenty patients will receive an inaccurate drug test result, which is more likely
to be a false positive than a false negative).
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estimated to eventually decrease health care spending,26 but it also
helps to ensure the safety of the doctor-visiting public.27
Despite the logic behind drug testing medical professionals, calls
to implement such testing, especially on a random basis, repeatedly fail
in the political arena.28 Accordingly, to finally pass state-mandated
testing for chemical impairment into law, a testing policy that is
appropriately tailored to the medical field is necessary. This Comment
will discuss the guideposts that belong in a model state statute to
provide for the testing of health care workers.
Part II of this Comment will explain the origins and proposed
measures of California’s Proposition 46 and New Hampshire’s HB-597,
as well as the reasons why they were rejected and limited, respectively.
Part III expounds on the need to test health care workers (HCWs)29
based on recent data brought to light by the debates surrounding
Proposition 46. Part IV will explain the constitutional framework for
drug testing set forth in United States Supreme Court precedent, and
Part V will employ that framework to demonstrate that HCWs are an
appropriate class of employees to test for impairment, such that testing
would be a reasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.
Part VI will set forth guideposts to include in drug testing
legislation that is appropriately tailored to the medical field, taking
into account the shortcomings of Proposition 46 and the original HB597, the profession’s self-regulation, and the consequences of relying
26

CAL. ATTORNEY GEN., PROPOSITION 46, ANALYSIS BY THE LEG. ANALYST 31,
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/pdf/proposition-46-title-summaryanalysis.pdf (reporting the findings of an analyst retained by the state of California to
assess the effects of Proposition 46, which revealed that random testing would deter
physicians from substance use while on duty, leading to fewer medical errors and, thus,
a decrease in overall health care spending); see also Michael R. Oreskovich et al.,
Prevalence of Alcohol Use Disorders Among American Surgeons, ARCH. SURG., Feb. 2012, at
168, 17071 (explaining that, according to a study, testing might reduce malpractice
litigation because “[s]urgeons with alcohol abuse or dependence constituted 77.7% of
surgeons reporting a medical error in the previous 3 months,” which “suggest[s] a
potential relationship [between alcohol abuse or dependence and] quality of care”).
27
It follows that if testing decreases the amount of medical errors, hospitals
and/or doctors would be sued less frequently, avoiding litigation costs and providing
patients with a safer and healthier supply of medical professionals.
28
See discussion infra Parts II.B & II.D.
29
This Comment proposes guideposts for drug testing all “health care workers,”
a group that includes any professional who treats, or assists in the treatment of, a
patient in any way and any professional with access to drugs in a medical setting. See
Occupational Outlook Handbook: Healthcare Occupations, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/healthcare/
home.htm. For example, a phlebotomist and a pharmacist would be within the “HCW”
category for purposes of this Comment, while a dietitian would not. Id.

HALAT (DO NOT DELETE)

944

3/17/2016 12:55 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:939

on a drug test alone to ensure patient safety. Part VII examines the
unintended consequences of drug testing HCWs and rebuts the
common oppositions to testing. Finally, Part VIII will conclude the
Comment, demonstrating that the need for drug testing in the medical
field far outweighs the negative consequences and costs.
II. THE TROY AND ALANA PACK PATIENT SAFETY ACT AND NEW
HAMPSHIRE HB-597
Proposition 46, entitled the Pack Patient Safety Act (PPSA), and
HB-597 were two attempts to effect change in the regulation of the
medical field by calling for the random drug and alcohol testing of
physicians. Although the bills differed in their details, they are similar
in that they were reactions to tragic incidents by impaired doctors, and
they ultimately could not amass the support to become law.
A. The Troy and Alana Pack Patient Safety Act: Origins and Proposed
Measures
The PPSA was introduced by California resident Bob Pack, who
began his fight against medical negligence when his two children were
struck and killed by a driver who was under the influence of alcohol
and drugs—drugs that had been prescribed to her by six different
doctors working within the same hospital.30 The physicians failed to
check the state’s prescription drug monitoring system, called the
Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System
(CURES), prior to prescribing painkillers to the driver, Jimena
Barreto.31
What looked like a clear case of medical malpractice was not as
helpful as might appear—under California’s Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), the Packs would be limited to an
award of $250,000 for the loss of their children after a successful suit
against the doctors for their negligence.32 Dissatisfied with the
remedies available to those suffering such losses, Mr. Pack introduced
30

New Measure Would Require Drug Testing for Doctors, ABC 7 NEWS (May 16, 2014),
http://abc7news.com/news/new-measure-would-require-drug-testing-fordoctors/64182/.
31
Lisa Girion & Scott Glover, Reckless Doctors Go Unchecked, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 30,
2012),
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/30/local/la-me-prescription-cures20121230.
32
Nanette Miranda, Father Working to Change Law on Medical Malpractice Lawsuits,
ABC 7 NEWS (Aug. 16, 2013), http://abclocal.go.com/story?section=news/
politics&id=9209527 (explaining that MICRA has not been adjusted for inflation since
its passage in 1975, which would today amount to $1.1 million); see also Proposition 46,
supra note 10, at sec. 2.
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the PPSA in 2013 in an effort to require doctors to use CURES to
prevent patients from “doctor shopping” as Barretto had, and to raise
the cap on medical malpractice damages in the event that the system
once again failed to prevent such a catastrophe.33
For purposes of this Comment, the most important provision in
the PPSA is the statewide drug and alcohol testing of physicians with
admitting privileges,34 a group with a recognized substance abuse
problem.35 In fact, in a March 2000 report, the Medical Board of
California (the “California Board”) announced that eighteen percent
of Californian physicians “may abuse alcohol or drugs during their
lifetime.”36 Since 2003, the California Board has disciplined 326
physicians for drug or alcohol abuse,37 imposing sanctions in forty-six
such cases between 2012 and 2013 alone.38 In addition, unlike most
states, California does not offer its physicians a “bypass rehabilitation
program,” through which doctors can avoid disciplinary action if they
comply with treatment and practice restrictions.39 California shut
down its program in 2008 after finding that it “permitt[ed] impaired
physicians to continue to practice” and was not “effective in adequately
protecting patients from substandard care.”40
33

See Press Release, Consumer Watchdog, Consumer Watchdog Campaign: Prop
46 Requiring Physicians to Check Statewide Prescription Drug Database Can Save Up
to $406 Million Annually (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/
newsrelease/consumer-watchdog-campaign-prop-46-requiring-physicians-checkstatewide-prescription-dru; see also Miranda, supra note 32.
34
Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.25(a), (a)(1) (providing that
“hospitals shall conduct testing . . . on physicians who are employees or contractors or
who have the privilege to admit patients,” covering nearly the whole spectrum of
physicians practicing within a hospital).
35
Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 2 (citing studies from the Annals of Internal
Medicine, which reveal that “at least one in ten physicians suffers from drug or alcohol
abuse during his or her career” and that one-third of physicians will experience a
condition, such as substance abuse, that will affect the safety of their practice).
36
MED. BD. OF CAL., PHYSICIAN DIVERSION PROGRAM 6 (2000),
http://www.protectconsumerjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/MBC.pdf.
37
Press Release, Consumer Watchdog, Consumer Watchdog Campaign: Dr.
Stephen Loyd, Who Survived Substance Abuse, Warns of Undetected Physician
Impairment and Says New Ad Against Prop. 46 Will “Cost People Their Lives” (Oct. 6,
2014),
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/newsrelease/consumer-watchdogcampaign-dr-stephen-loyd-who-survived-substance-abuse-warns-undetected.
38
MED. BD. OF CAL., 2012–2013 ANNUAL REPORT, at vii (2013),
http://www.mbc.ca.gov/Publications/Annual_Reports/annual_report_20122013.pdf.
39
Keith H. Berge et al., Chemical Dependency and the Physician, MAYO CLINIC
PROCEEDINGS, July 2009, at 625, 630, http://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/
article/S0025-6196%2811%2960751-9/pdf.
40
Id.; see also Peter Eisler, Doctors, Medical Staff on Drugs Put Patients at Risk, USA
TODAY (Apr. 17, 2014, 5:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
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To implement the testing program, the PPSA would have adopted
the guidelines used by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),41
which govern the drug and alcohol workplace policies for pilots, air
traffic controllers, and other employees working on or near aircrafts.42
While the PPSA cross-referenced the FAA policy,43 it specifically
enumerated key features of its proposed program in the text of the
initiative itself, the most controversial of which targeted testing.44
Under the PPSA, the California Board would have required doctors to
be tested after an “adverse event,” such as performing an incorrect
procedure on a patient, prescribing the wrong medication, or
engaging in other similar events as listed in Section 1279.1 of the
California Health and Safety Code.45 The Act required that within
twelve hours of learning of the event, the physician that treated the
patient or prescribed him medication during the twenty-four hours
preceding the incident, report to a hospital for testing, for which he
must pay out of his own pocket.46 Upon a physician’s failure to appear
for testing or refusal to provide a sample, the Attorney General’s
Health Quality Enforcement Section would have immediately
suspended him pending an investigation and notified his employer of
both the suspension and investigation.47
Finally, the PPSA would have tested doctors on the basis of
referrals by colleagues and supervisors upon a reasonable suspicion of
drug or alcohol use or impairment.48 This objective was problematic
due to the medical profession’s notorious culture of silence,49 but the

2014/04/15/doctors-addicted-drugs-health-care-diversion/7588401/.
41
Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.10 (proposing that physicians be
tested according to 49 C.F.R. § 40, the testing procedure utilized by the Department
of Transportation (DOT)); see also 49 C.F.R. § 40 (2016). The FAA is regulated by the
DOT, so its policy largely mirrors the DOT guidelines but includes provisions tailored
for aviation employees. 14 C.F.R. § 120 (2016).
42
49 C.F.R. § 40; 14 C.F.R. § 120.
43
Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.10.
44
Id. at sec. 4.
45
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1279.1(b)(1)(C), (b)(4)(A) (Deering 2016).
46
Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.25(a)(2), (b).
47
Id. at sec. 4 § 2350.30; see also Eisler, supra note 40 (highlighting the difficulty in
identifying substance abuse within the medical field and noting that disciplinary
action, “such as suspension of a license to practice, is rare and often doesn’t occur
until a practitioner has committed multiple transgressions”).
48
Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.25(a)(3).
49
Many sources have discussed the unwillingness of HCWs to report an
intoxicated colleague. See Eisler, supra note 40 (stating that despite the numerous
times David Kwiatkowski was caught unconscious at work near an empty syringe or
running to the bathroom in the middle of a procedure to tend to his addiction, his
colleagues never took any action); Carla K. Johnson, Many Docs Don’t Blow Whistle on
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PPSA aimed to break down such barriers by mandating that physicians
come forward when they believe a colleague may be, or may have been,
impaired by drugs or alcohol while working.50
The DOT testing guidelines underlie the FAA regulations and call
for the testing, and confirmatory testing, of an employee’s breath and
urine samples.51 If the second test reveals a negative result, the
laboratory considers both results as negative, and the matter is
concluded.52 If the test result is positive, the HCW may provide a legal
explanation for the presence of the drug.53 If he is unable to do so, his
results are forwarded to the California Board, triggering the same
disciplinary procedures that follow a failure or refusal to test.54 Like
the FAA guidelines,55 the PPSA suggested testing for the presence of
“marijuana metabolites, cocaine metabolites, amphetamines, opiate
metabolites, and phencyclidine.”56
Colleagues,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(July
14,
2010,
11:05
AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/14/many-docs-dont-blowwhist_n_645703.html (reporting that seventeen percent of doctors surveyed by the
Harvard Medical School had “direct, personal knowledge” of a doctor who had been
working while “impaired or incompetent,” yet one-third had not reported their
colleague).
50
Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.20. The PPSA did not specify the
consequences for a failure to report a colleague. Id. It would, however, have imposed
a statutory duty upon Californian doctors to report an impaired colleague, which they
are not otherwise required to do. See Frequently Asked QuestionsComplaint Review
Process, MED. BD. OF CAL., http://www.mbc.ca.gov/Consumers/Complaints/
Complaints_FAQ/Complaint_Process_FAQ.aspx (last visited Feb. 14, 2016)
(explaining that physicians are not statutorily obligated to report an impaired
colleague pursuant to the Medical Practice Act, but are encouraged by the California
Board to do so); see also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 805(b) (Deering 2016) (mandating
only that the chief of staff of a peer review body or the chief executive officer of a
medical facility file a report with the Medical Board of California upon a final decision
on disciplinary action as to an employee).
51
See 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.251 (for alcohol), 40.87 (for drugs) (2016); see also
Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.15(g) (providing for confirmatory testing
of samples).
52
See 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.255 (for alcohol), 40.87 (for drugs).
53
49 C.F.R. § 40.141; see also Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.15(g)
(providing doctors a chance to explain a positive test result).
54
Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.30 (requiring doctors to report
any verified positive results, willful failures, or refusals to test to the Medical Board and
enumerating the consequences of a positive result or a failure or refusal to test).
55
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT DRUG TESTING: ON AND AFTER OCTOBER 1,
2010STILL A 5-PANEL, http://www.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/Part%
2040DOT5-PanelNotice_0.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
56
Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.15(d); but see Medical Professional,
LABCORP, https://www.labcorp.com/wps/portal/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy
8xBz9CP0os_hACzO_QCM_IwN3dyNXAyNjQ2MvHxcXYwNjM6B8JJK8hVGoBVDeN
cjZ0MTXwMDdmIBuP4_83FT9gtyIcgBVIMyI/dl2/d1/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS9ZQnB3Lz
ZfUTg2TlEyTjIwR0cyRTAyMzEzSkxERDMwVDM!/ (last visited Feb. 14, 2016)

HALAT (DO NOT DELETE)

948

3/17/2016 12:55 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:939

B. The Pack Patient Safety Act: What Went Wrong?
The University of Southern California Dornsife and the Los
Angeles Times, in a September 2014 poll, revealed that seventy percent
of people supported the PPSA’s testing mandate.57 By Election Day,
Proposition 46 proponents, comprised mostly of lawyers’ and
consumers’ groups,58 amassed $12.4 million in support of the PPSA.59
Other supporters included Democratic Party leaders and public safety
and consumer advocates, such as Erin Brockovich and the founder of
Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Candace Lightner.60
Conversely, PPSA opponents raised $57.8 million to combat the
initiative,61 with the majority of the funds coming “from three medical
malpractice insurers—the Cooperative of American Physicians, the
Doctors Company and NORCAL Mutual Insurance Company,” each
contributing at least $10 million.62 Other opponents included medical
groups, labor unions, and civil liberties groups.63 With over four times
as much money as the proponents, the anti-PPSA campaign succeeded
in reaching voters via “a cascade of negative advertising” to drive home
the message that the PPSA “would send medical costs soaring and drive
doctors from the state.”64
Although the post-election analyses are not clear on exactly what
influenced voters, the late addition of the testing mandate to the
initiative and the heavy campaigning by medical insurance groups
suggest that most opponents were moved more by a desire to prevent
the increase of the medical malpractice cap than the testing mandate.65
(offering a customizable drug test for HCWs based on the drugs available in the
employer’s workplace); Medical Professional Panels, QUEST DIAGNOSTICS,
http://blog.employersolutions.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/MedProFinal.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2016) (same).
57
USC Press Release, supra note 12.
58
BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 10.
59
Haverluck, supra note 17.
60
BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 10.
61
Haverluck, supra note 17.
62
Melanie Mason, Poll: Weak Support for Prop. 46 Targeting Medical Malpractice, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 13, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/politics/la-me-polpoll-malpractice-20140913-story.html#page=1.
63
BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 10.
64
Voters Turn Down Proposition 46 To Lift Medical Malpractice Cap, Require Drug Tests
CBS
SF
BAY
AREA
(Nov.
4,
2014,
11:20
PM),
For
Doctors,
http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/11/04/proposition-46-doctors-drug-testsresults/.
65
Adam Nagourney, California Asks: Should Doctors Face Drug Tests?, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/us/california-asks-shoulddoctors-face-drug-tests.html?_r=0 (explaining that the testing provision was added to
the initiative to gain support for the PPSA’s main goal of raising the medical
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In fact, a few doctors and insurance group representatives have
candidly said just that.66 Accordingly, it appears that Californians are
largely receptive to the idea of state-mandated drug and alcohol testing
of physicians.67
C. New Hampshire’s HB-597: Origins and Measures
In 2012, thirty-two patients of the cardiac catheterization lab at
New Hampshire’s Exeter Hospital were diagnosed with Hepatitis C.68
The diagnoses surfaced after the hospital caught onto the antics of
medical technician David Kwiatkowski, a fentanyl addict who bounced
from hospital to hospital for nearly a decade, diverting drugs from
each facility until his superiors discovered his addiction and asked him
to leave.69 Kwiatkowski worked in numerous hospitals across eight
states, sometimes being fired less than two weeks into an assignment.70
Although his employers had their suspicions, only one filed a
complaint with the American Registry of Radiologic Technicians
(ARRT), the national organization responsible for credentialing
technicians and ensuring their adherence to industry ethical
standards.71 Ultimately, even the AART’s investigation met a dead-end,
and Kwiatkowski eventually found himself in New Hampshire’s Exeter
Hospital on a temporary assignment, thanks to his staffing agency.72
Despite staff misgivings and resistance, Exeter hired Kwiatkowski as a
full-time employee.73
One year later, an investigation into the Hepatitis C outbreak
among the hospital’s patients revealed that thirty-two patients had
contracted the disease as a result of contaminated syringes:
Kwiatkowski had been injecting himself with the patients’ fentanyl and

malpractice cap).
66
Bob Egelko, High-Impact Details in Initiative Aimed at Doctors, SFGATE (Oct. 30,
2013, 7:47 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/High-impact-details-ininitiative-aimed-at-doctors-4940955.php (quoting Molly Weedn, California Medical
Association spokeswoman, as saying that PPSA’s CURES and testing provisions were
“nothing more than window dressing”).
67
USC Press Release, supra note 12 (indicating that seventy percent of
respondents favored the testing mandate, and forty-six percent of voters opposed
increasing the medical malpractice cap).
68
Abramson et al., supra note 6.
69
Id. at 10, 11–12.
70
Id. at 11–12 (explaining that Kwiatkowski was found unresponsive in a
bathroom at work after overdosing on fentanyl merely two weeks into his assignment
at Arizona Heart Hospital).
71
Id.
72
Id. at 12.
73
Id.
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replacing the used syringes with saline, knowing that they would soon
be used on the patients.74 Consequently, in 2013, New Hampshire
State Representatives introduced HB-597 to require state-licensed
facilities to create a testing program to randomly test each HCW at least
four times per year; if a facility failed to test, its license with the state
would be suspended.75
D. HB-597: What Went Wrong?
HB-597, entitled “An Act Relative to a Drug-Free Workplace for
Licensed Health Care Facilities and Providers,” had some support due
to the success of drug testing programs in the anesthesiology
departments of two out-of-state hospitals.76 Unfortunately, the New
Hampshire Legislature diluted the bill before its passage, with the final
version only requiring “health facilities to adopt policies permitting
suspicion-based drug testing.”77 The main reason for HB-597’s change
in testing policy was cost: John Poirier, the president of New
Hampshire’s Health Care Association, claimed it would cost $2.6
million per year to test all 15,000 of the state’s HCWs.78 Proponents of
the original measure argued, however, that the change essentially
gutted the bill, especially since most hospitals, like Exeter Hospital,
already had suspicion-based testing policies in place before HB-597 was
passed.79
III. THE NEED TO RUN TESTS ON OUR DOCTORS
Despite its political unpopularity, data largely supports the idea of
drug testing HCWs. According to a 2010 study, “[t]he rate of addiction
among practicing physicians is estimated to be between 10% and 12%,
the same as or slightly higher than the rate in the general population,”
with alcohol being the drug of choice in almost half of all HCW
substance abuse cases.80 Another study, published in the American
74

Abramson et al., supra note 6.
Id. at 13.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 14.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Marvin D. Seppala & Keith H. Berge, The Addicted Physician: A Rational Response
to an Irrational Disease, MINN. MED., Feb. 2010, at 1, https://www.mnhospitals.org/
Portals/0/Documents/ptsafety/diversion/the-addicted-physician-a-rational-responseto-an-irrational-disease.pdf; see also Oreskovich et al., supra note 26, at 170 (discussing
a survey of 7000 members of the American College of Surgeons, which revealed that
15.4% of the respondents had responses “consistent with alcohol abuse or
dependence”).
75
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Journal of Medical Sciences, found that “approximately 15% of physicians
will be impaired at some point in their careers.”81 Furthermore, studies
have shown that “chemical dependence is considered the most
common disabling illness” among physicians,82 and that physicians’ use
of opioids (17.6% of physicians) and of benzodiazepine (11.4%) is
roughly five times higher than that of the general population.83
Impaired HCWs can harm patients in a myriad of ways. To begin
with the obvious, a chemically impaired doctor operating on a patient
can seriously injure, or even kill, a patient. Such is the case with Dr.
Christopher Duntsch, an alcoholic neurosurgeon from Texas whose
performance was so horrific that the doctor called in to repair the
damage caused by Duntsch contacted Duntsch’s medical school to see
if he had actually graduated.84 Although a former colleague at another
hospital had already filed a complaint with the Texas Medical Board
by this time, the bureaucratic entity moved so slowly that Dr. Duntsch
operated on three more patients at his new hospital, killing one of
them.85
Additionally, as was the case in New Hampshire, HCWs can harm
patients through drug diversion, “the illegal removal of drugs from a
healthcare facility.”86 Like Kwiatkowski, Kristen Parker infected over a
dozen patients with Hepatitis C via her contaminated syringes filled
with saline, while Steven Beumel “infected at least five people with [the
disease]”—both were sentenced to thirty years in prison for their
crimes.87
Further compounding the difficulty in effectively drug testing
HCWs is the culture of silence that permeates the medical field. In
2010, a study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association
revealed that of the 2000 physicians surveyed, seventeen percent said
that they had personally known an impaired or incompetent physician
in the past three years; two-thirds of them did not report their
colleague to the relevant authority.88
81

Eugene V. Boisaubin & Ruth E. Levine, Identifying and Assisting the Impaired
Physician, AM. J. MED. SCI., July 2001, at 31, 31, http://www.ophed.net/system/files/
2009/07/impaired-physician-1966-1966.pdf.
82
Abramson et al., supra note 6.
83
Id.
84
Saul Elbein, Anatomy of a Tragedy, TEXAS OBSERVER (Aug. 28, 2013, 2:01 PM),
http://www.texasobserver.org/anatomy-tragedy/.
85
Id.
86
Abramson et al., supra note 6.
87
Daniel R. Levinson & Erika T. Broadhurst, Opinion, Why Aren’t Doctors Drug
Tested, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2014, at A27.
88
Pee in This Cup, Doc: Random Drug Tests Should Be Standard for Physicians,
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Once again, Mr. Kwiatkowski is a perfect example of this
unfortunate phenomenon. Although various health care facilities in
Michigan fired him for “gross misconduct” and “test[ing] positive for
controlled substances,” his employers did not even inform his staffing
agency, let alone the organization that certified him, which allowed
Kwiatkowski to continue to infect patients in hospitals across the
country.89 Even when the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center
finally alerted Kwiatkowski’s staffing agency that it had fired
Kwiatkowski after finding three empty syringes on his person, a needle
and an empty syringe in his locker, and fentanyl and opiates in his
urine, his staffing agency still did not report his conduct to the ARRT;
the agency instead provided him with another assignment.90 The
incident at the Arizona Heart Hospital of Phoenix, Arizona finally
broke the pattern: when Kwiatkowski’s colleagues found him in the
hospital bathroom after he overdosed on fentanyl just two weeks into
his assignment, Arizona Heart informed Kwiatkowski’s staffing agency,
which notified the AART.91 Unfortunately, the AART dropped its
investigation into the matter when it learned that the Phoenix Police
Department chose not to press charges against Kwiatkowski.92
Another example comes from the case of Dr. Duntsch, the Texas
neurosurgeon.93 As part of the lawsuits filed by his injured patients,
the plaintiffs alleged that Baylor Regional Medical Center of Plano—
the hospital at which Dr. Duntsch practiced—failed to report him to
the authorities because it had advanced him $600,000 to join the
facility after finishing his residency at the University of Tennessee.94
Thus, the plaintiffs argued, the hospital failed to reveal the doctor’s
ineptitude because “Baylor had spent a lot of money on Duntsch,” and
“if he didn’t work, [it] didn’t get paid.”95 The patients also alleged that
the hospital failed to act after Duntsch “skipped out on five drug tests
that [it] asked him to take” and instead continued to advertise his
services to the public.96

SCIENTIFIC AM. (Nov. 1, 2014), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/pee-in-thiscup-doc-random-drug-tests-should-be-standard-for-physicians/.
89
Abramson et al., supra note 6, at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
90
Id.
91
Id. at 12.
92
Id. at 12.
93
See infra text accompanying footnote 84.
94
Saul Elbein, Licensed to Kill: Lawsuit Seeks to Overturn Texas Hospital Shield Law,
THE GUARDIAN (May 2, 2014, 10:04 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2014/may/02/texas-legal-doctor-lawsuit-christopher-duntsch.
95
Id.
96
Id.
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Based on the studies revealing substance abuse by physicians and
the vivid examples of how the culture of silence enabled the deadly
practices of Mr. Kwiatkowski and Dr. Duntsch, there is a strong need
to test health care workers for drugs and alcohol.
IV. TESTING HCWS CONSTITUTES A REASONABLE SEARCH UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Based on the constitutional framework for drug and alcohol
testing set forth in United States Supreme Court precedent,97 HCWs
are in fact an appropriate class of employees to test for impairment.
Although the problem of workplace intoxication by drugs or alcohol
has been acknowledged in some industries for over a century,98 it was
not until the 1980s that a wide cross-section of employers began
utilizing tests to ensure that employees were not impaired on the job.99
After the Supreme Court decided the landmark cases of Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives’ Association100 and National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab,101 a framework for analyzing the constitutionality of
workplace drug testing began to take shape. The Supreme Court
refined the test in the late 1990s after handing down Vernonia School
District 47J v. Acton102 and Chandler v. Miller.103 As a result of these four
cases, employers ascertained that they could lawfully test their
employees when a governmental interest in testing, beyond the
ordinary law enforcement need to collect criminal evidence, is both
present and sufficiently strong as to outweigh the employee’s interest
in privacy.104
Using this framework, employers have implemented, and courts
have upheld as constitutional, the testing of employees: in “safetysensitive” occupations;105 who enjoy a diminished expectation of
97

See infra Part IV.B.
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989) (“The problem of
alcohol use on American railroads is as old as the industry itself, and efforts to deter it
by carrier rules began at least a century ago.”).
99
Id. at 607–08 (explaining that in 1983, the Federal Railroad Administration
(FRA) promulgated regulations requiring railroads to test pockets of employees after
finding that industry prohibitions on alcohol were insufficient to address widespread
drug and alcohol abuse); see also Exec. Order No. 12,564, 51 Fed. Reg. 32889 (Sept.
15, 1986), http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/
12564.html (establishing a testing policy for all federal employees).
100
489 U.S. 602 (1989).
101
489 U.S. 656 (1989).
102
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
103
520 U.S. 305 (1997).
104
Id. at 313–14.
105
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633.
98
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privacy by virtue of working in a highly regulated field;106 and whose
individual interest in privacy is outweighed by a governmental interest
in ensuring that they are not impaired while working.107 Classes of
employees that fall within this framework include teachers,108 trucking
company drivers,109 and flight attendants.110
A. Constitutional Rules as Set Forth by the Supreme Court
1. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association
Skinner is the first workplace drug testing case that the Supreme
Court heard and upheld. After a private railroad implemented a
testing policy to comply with the regulations enacted by the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA), a labor union filed suit to enjoin the
testing.111 The FRA’s regulations aimed to address the industry-old
problem of alcohol abuse on the railroad, which had resulted in
accidents, fatalities, and millions of dollars in property damage.112
In the event of an “impact accident,” the FRA mandated that
employers collect and test blood and urine samples from the
employees “directly involved” in the incident.113 The regulations
allowed employees an opportunity to explain a positive test before the
FRA prepared an investigative report and required a nine-month
suspension of those who refused to provide a sample.114 Lastly, the
regulations permitted employers to test employees’ breath or urine
after an accident or safety violation, or based upon a reasonable
suspicion garnered from “specific, personal observations” that the

106

Id. at 627.
Id. at 633.
108
Knox Cty. Educ. Ass’n v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 384 (6th Cir.
1998) (finding that teachers occupy safety-sensitive positions because they monitor
children entrusted to their care and have immediate impact upon a child’s life).
109
Overview of Drug and Alcohol Rules, FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN.,
http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/overview-drug-and-alcohol-rules (last updated Apr. 8,
2015).
110
Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451, 457 n.10 (9th Cir. 1990) (opining that “the
administrative record adequately supports the FAA determination that [flight
attendant] positions are, in fact, safety-sensitive”).
111
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 612.
112
Id. at 606–07 (discussing the FRA’s evidence that between 1972 and 1983, more
than twenty accidents involving “alcohol or drug use as a probable cause or
contributing factor” and “result[ing] in 25 fatalities, 61 non-fatal injuries, and property
damage estimated at $19 million (approximately $27 million in 1982 dollars)” had
occurred on railroads) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
113
Id. at 609.
114
Id. at 610–11.
107
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employee was impaired on the job.115
The Supreme Court upheld the testing, establishing first that the
Fourth Amendment,116 which protects individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures, applies to “certain arbitrary and invasive acts by
officers of the Government” and those “act[ing] as an instrument or
agent” thereof.117 Accordingly, the private railroad’s search implicated
the Fourth Amendment because of the degree of governmental
involvement: the FRA regulations mandated the search, proving the
government’s “encouragement, endorsement, and participation” of
the testing.118
Next, the Court recognized the blood, breath, and urine testing
as Fourth Amendment searches because the tests infringe upon
“expectation[s] of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.”119 Blood and breath tests physically intrude upon the
body to obtain a sample of blood or “deep lung” breaths for analysis.120
While urinalysis is not physically intrusive in the same way, the process
by which the sample is obtained is irrefutably private.121 Likewise, the
information revealed by urinalysis is personal, ranging from drug use
to medical conditions, such as epilepsy and diabetes.122
After establishing that such testing falls within the ambit of the
Constitution, the Court paved the way to warrantlessly collecting
specimens for testing.123 The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant
to conduct a search, but that necessity is dispensed with when an
exception applies.124 Luckily for employers, one such exception
applies when “special needs [] beyond the normal need for law
enforcement” motivate the search.125 In such a case, rather than
requiring a warrant or even a showing of probable cause to assess the
reasonableness of the search, a court merely balances the
government’s interest in conducting the search on the one hand and
115

Id. at 611.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .”).
117
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613–14.
118
Id. at 615–16.
119
Id. at 617.
120
Id. (citation and internal quotations marks omitted).
121
Id. (“[T]here are few activities in our society more personal or private than the
passing of urine. Most people describe it by euphemisms if they talk about it at all.”
(quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (1987))).
122
Id.
123
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624.
124
Id. at 619.
125
Id. (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
116
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the intrusion of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights on the
other.126
The Skinner Court identified the government’s interest as
ensuring the safety of railroad employees and the train-commuting
public, deterring employee use of drugs and alcohol, and ascertaining
and eliminating the causes of accidents.127 In fact, the “safety-sensitive
tasks” that the covered employees performed, such as operating the
trains and maintaining the signal systems, made the government
interest in Skinner even stronger, since these were “duties fraught with
such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of attention
can have disastrous consequences.”128
The Court then balanced the employees’ interest in privacy and
bodily integrity against the government’s strong interest in safety and
found that, while not insignificant, the employees’ privacy interests
were minimally implicated by the testing program.129 To begin with,
blood tests are routinely and safely performed during annual physicals,
such that they do not hurt or traumatize employees.130 Breath tests are
even less intrusive and can be done “with a minimum of inconvenience
or embarrassment.”131 Likewise, while urinalysis implicates privacy
concerns, the FRA regulations ensure a minimal intrusion by not
requiring direct observation and by having non-railroad personnel
obtain the samples in a medical environment.132 Under such
circumstances, the urinalysis is similar to providing a urine sample
during an annual physical.133 Furthermore, because the railroad
industry is heavily regulated, employees have a “diminished
expectation of privacy” as to “information relating to the[ir] physical
condition,” such that their career choice decreases their privacy
interest.134 The Court also noted that the regulations themselves
provided those administering the tests with minimal discretion.135

126

Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979), and United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976)).
127
Id. at 621, 632.
128
Id. at 620, 628.
129
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624–25.
130
Id. at 625 (explaining that blood tests generally extract minimal amounts of
blood and “that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma, or
pain” (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966))) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
131
Id. at 625.
132
Id. at 626–27.
133
Id. at 627.
134
Id. at 627–28.
135
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.
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Finally, the Court emphasized that the FRA created a program
with “an effective means of deterring employees . . . from using
controlled substances or alcohol in the first place.”136 Based on all of
the circumstances, Skinner held that the test minimally intruded on
privacy interests.137 As such, it was reasonable for the government to
test safety-sensitive employees for impairment with neither a warrant
nor probable cause because these employees can “cause great human
loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to supervisors
or others.”138
2. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab
In this Skinner companion case, the U.S. Customs Service, which
processes people and items entering the country, implemented a
testing policy for employees directly involved in drug interdiction,
carrying firearms, or having access to “classified material.”139 The
Service tested employees for “marijuana, cocaine, opiates,
amphetamines, and phencyclidine,” and required them to provide a
sample while a monitor listened “for the normal sounds of
urination.”140 Following a confirmatory test, the Service sent the
positive results to a licensed physician, who evaluated them along with
the employee’s medical and prescription information to verify the
presence of illegal substances.141 If the physician concluded that there
was no legal explanation for the positive result, the employee would be
dismissed.142
To decide the case, the Supreme Court applied the
reasonableness test just announced in Skinner.143 The government
interests identified in Von Raab included deterring employees from
using drugs and alcohol and “prevent[ing] the promotion of drug
users to [the specified] positions.”144 The Court found that, as “our
Nation’s first line of defense” against drug importation and its
136

Id. at 629–30 (noting that the program informed employees that they were
subject to testing without disclosing the specific date, “significantly increas[ing] the
deterrent effect” of the policy and adding to its legitimacy).
137
Id. at 628.
138
Id.
139
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660–61 (1989).
140
Id. at 661–62.
141
Id. at 662.
142
Id. at 663.
143
Id. at 665–66 (summarizing the rule as holding that when a Fourth Amendment
search is conducted to advance a “special governmental need,” the reasonableness of
the search is determined by balancing the interests of the individual and of the
government).
144
Id. at 666.
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accompanying crime, Customs officials hold “safety-sensitive”
occupations—if the agents are not alert as a result of their drug use,
“[t]his national interest in self-protection could be irreparably
damaged.”145 Moreover, it is uncontroverted that handling weapons is
a safety-sensitive task fraught with risks of catastrophic injury.146 The
Court concluded that the public “should not bear the risk” of such
employees working while impaired and that the burden should instead
fall on the U.S. Customs Service and its employees.147
While Customs agents undoubtedly have an interest in their
bodily integrity and informational privacy, the majority held that the
agents’ interests are “diminished” with respect to “the intrusions
occasioned by a urine test.”148 As in Skinner, the Court emphasized the
effect of the nature of the employees’ occupation on their reasonable
expectation of privacy, and noted that employees working with drugs
and/or guns must expect inquiries as to “their fitness and probity.”149
Further, the procedures outlined in the policy minimized the
invasiveness of the program by avoiding direct observation, testing
solely for the presence of drugs, and not requiring the employee to
disclose his medical information unless he tested positive for drugs.150
Von Raab shed light on three additional considerations in
assessing the reasonableness of workplace testing. First, the Court
opined that requiring individualized suspicion in such a nontraditional work environment would be impracticable since Customs
agents are not amenable to “the kind of day-to-day scrutiny that is the
norm” in an office environment.151 Secondly, the lack of a known drug
problem pervading the Customs Service was not dispositive of the
program’s legality because “no segment of society is immune from the
threat of illegal drug use,” and in any event, the agency is entitled to
enact a program that seeks to both detect drug use and “prevent the
promotion of drug users.”152 Finally, the access that agents have to the
“vast sources of [confiscated] valuable contraband” provides another
reason to test, due to the inevitable temptation presented to drugusing employees.153

145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668, 670.
Id. at 670.
Id. at 670–71.
Id. at 672.
Id.
Id. at 672 n.2.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 674.
Id. at 660 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), 674–75.
Id. at 669.
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3. Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
The third drug testing case to reach the Supreme Court featured
a new kind of authority imposing the drug test: rather than an
employer testing its employees, in Acton, a school district, comprised
of a high school and three grade schools in Vernonia, Oregon, was
testing its students.154 After noticing an increase in drug use in the
1980s, the Vernonia School District implemented a testing program to
eradicate school drug use by testing “the leaders of the drug culture,”
the school athletes.155 In Vernonia, to join a school sports team, a
student had to submit a consent form, signed by himself and his
parents, agreeing to be drug tested at the beginning of the season and
then randomly throughout.156 The students provided the urine sample
in an “empty locker room accompanied by an adult monitor of the
same sex.”157 The samples were tested for amphetamines, cocaine, and
marijuana, but administrators could request testing for other drugs.158
An outside laboratory tested the samples and sent the reports to the
school superintendent, but the vice-principals and athletic directors
also had access to the results.159 A positive drug test resulted in either
a six-week assistance program with weekly urinalysis or suspension
from the team for the rest of the current season and the following
season.160
The plaintiff, a seventh-grade boy not admitted to the football
team for failure to sign the consent form, filed suit against the school
for violating his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.161 In
assessing the reasonableness of the program, the Court first noted the
key player in Acton: the administration of a public school district, an
entity with “a degree of supervision and control” over the minors
within its care.162 Because of the school’s caretaking role and the
students’ status as minors, Acton and his classmates necessarily enjoyed
a lesser expectation of privacy.163 Additionally, the student-athlete
subset reasonably held an even lower expectation of privacy because of
the regulations accompanying participation in school sports (such as

154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995).
Id. at 648–50.
Id. at 650.
Id.
Id. at 650–51.
Id. at 651.
Acton, 515 U.S. at 651.
Id.
Id. at 655.
Id. at 654.
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preseason physicals and minimum grade point averages), as well as the
public exposure inherent in being a part of a team (changing in the
locker rooms, communal showering, etc.).164
Further, the Court found the invasiveness of the sample-collecting
method “negligible.”165 Because the students provided the specimens
either from a urinal or bathroom stall, the “conditions [we]re nearly
identical to those typically encountered in public restrooms.”166
Although the majority expressed concern that the school required the
disclosure of medication information prior to testing, the Justices
noted that such disclosures did not present a significant infringement:
while precedent holds that it is favorable to not disclose prescription
data until after a positive test result, the Court never held that
“requiring advance disclosure of medications is per se unreasonable.”167
Ultimately, the Court found that the government’s interest in
deterring drug use among students is as weighty as deterring the same
among Customs officials involved in drug interdiction and engineers
operating locomotives.168 The majority reasoned that middle- and
high-school aged children are already especially susceptible to the
psychological and physiological effects of drugs, and the added
concern of impaired students physically injuring one another while
partaking in a school sporting event further solidified the school
district’s grave interest.169 Moreover, the Court found the program to
be effective because it merely tested the school’s student athletes, who
heavily influenced drug and alcohol use among the general student
body.170 Based on the students’ low expectation of privacy, the
program’s narrow tailoring and minimal level of intrusion, and the
strong government interest at hand, the Vernonia School District’s
drug screening policy was upheld as reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.171

164

Id. at 657.
Id. at 658.
166
Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.
167
Id. at 659.
168
Id. at 661.
169
Id. at 661–62.
170
Id. at 663 (opining that the school district may have been even more justified in
implementing this program than the government in Skinner because of how tailored
the school district’s solution was as compared to Skinner, which applied to all railroads
across the country).
171
Id. at 664–65.
165
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4. Chandler v. Miller
In 1997, the Supreme Court rounded out its approach to
employee drug testing when it handed down Chandler v. Miller.172 In
Chandler, the Georgia Legislature enacted a statute that required
candidates running for state office to test negatively for drugs “within
thirty days prior to qualifying for nomination or election.”173 The
plaintiffs, Libertarian Party nominees, filed suit to enjoin the program
for violating their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.174
Following the decisions in Skinner, Von Raab, and Acton, the Eleventh
Circuit upheld the district court’s denial of the injunction, finding that
political officials were “vested with the highest executive authority to
make public policy,” and as such, required “the highest levels of
honesty, clear-sightedness, and clear-thinking.”175
For the first time in the Court’s drug testing case history, it held
that the statute violated the candidates’ Fourth Amendment rights.176
The Supreme Court acknowledged that the test was minimally invasive:
the government tested only for the presence of drugs; the candidates
controlled the release of their results; and testing took place in a
doctor’s office of each candidate’s choosing.177 Nevertheless, Georgia
had not set forth a “sufficiently vital” special need to test—although
abusing drugs and/or alcohol is incompatible with the proper
discharge of public functions, the Court held that incompatibility
alone is not a special governmental need.178
The majority also noted that the conditions that weighed toward
a finding of reasonableness in prior cases were not present in Chandler,
such as “a demonstrated problem of drug abuse,”179 the inability to
monitor the employees daily to garner an individualized suspicion,180
and the existence of “high-risk, safety-sensitive tasks.”181 As such, the
Court concluded that Georgia’s need was not special, but rather
172

Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
Id. at 309–10 (some of the offices for which Georgia required testing include:
governor or lieutenant governor; state Attorney General; state court judge; district
attorney; or Public Service Commission member).
174
Id. at 310.
175
Id. at 311.
176
Id. at 323.
177
Id. at 312, 318.
178
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318, 321–22.
179
Id. at 319.
180
Id. at 321.
181
Id. at 321–22. The Court distinguished this case from Skinner and Von Raab by
emphasizing that politicians do not genuinely endanger public safety through their
actions. Id. at 323.
173
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“symbolic,” and opined that infringing personal privacy for the sake of
a symbol is precisely what the Fourth Amendment was intended to
prevent.182
B. Framework
The guidance provided by Skinner, Von Raab, Acton, and Chandler
demonstrates that when a search is conducted for reasons besides
ordinary law enforcement needs, it constitutes a “special need.”183 Such
a need dispenses with the traditional requirements of a warrant and
probable cause to search an individual.184 Accordingly, to determine
the reasonableness of the search, the court must balance the
government’s interest in testing against the employee’s privacy
interests.185 Some of the factors that the Court has considered in this
determination include: whether the employee performs safetysensitive duties;186 whether the employee works in a highly regulated
field;187 whether the industry currently faces a drug and/or alcohol use
problem;188 how much the test intrudes upon privacy interests;189 and
whether the government interest is in the health and safety of
employees and/or third parties, or a symbolic interest in a drug free
appearance.190
V. DRUG TESTING HCWS WOULD NOT VIOLATE THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
The Fourth Amendment protects the right of citizens “to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”191 The Supreme Court has held
that the Fourth Amendment “guarantees the privacy, dignity, and
security of persons against . . . invasive acts by officers of the
Government or those acting at their direction.”192 In Acton, the
182

Id. at 322.
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321–22; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620; Nat’l Treasury Emps.
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 669–70 (1989).
187
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995); Skinner, 489 U.S. at
627; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671–72.
188
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321; Acton, 515 U.S. at 648–49; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606–07.
189
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318; Acton, 515 U.S. at 658; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 624–25; Von
Raab, 489 U.S. at 672.
190
Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321–22; Skinner, 489 U.S. at 630.
191
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
192
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 613–14.
183
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Supreme Court clarified that state-administered or -mandated testing
triggers the protections of the Fourth Amendment because the Bill of
Rights is incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply
to state and local governments.193 Accordingly, should a state adopt a
statute mandating the drug testing of HCWs, as Proposition 46 and the
original HB-597 proposed to do, the statute would be subject to the
Fourth Amendment because employers would be acting at the
direction of the state government.194 Further, the tests qualify as
searches because the Skinner Court held that subjecting individuals to
breathalyzer tests and urinalysis is an intrusion on a reasonable
expectation of privacy that implicates the Fourth Amendment.195
As seen in the Skinner-Von Raab line of cases, workplace drug and
alcohol testing is motivated by a “special need,” such that neither a
warrant nor probable cause is required to lawfully test.196 Because a
model testing statute would not aim primarily to release test results to
law enforcement, but instead to ascertain and deter impairment
among physicians, such a statute would be motivated by a “special
need.”197 Thus, the reasonableness of the statute would be determined
by balancing the competing interests of the government and the
individual.
A. The State Interest Inquiry
Assessing the government’s interest in drug testing entails
considering both the nature and immediacy of the state’s need to test
and the efficacy of the means by which the government achieves that
goal.198
1. The Nature and Immediacy of the State’s Need to Test
The nature of the government concern at issue is the undeniably
important interest in protecting the public, and the concern is
immediate because of the safety-sensitive tasks performed by HCWs, as
193

Acton, 515 U.S. at 652 (“We have held that the Fourteenth Amendment extends
this constitutional guarantee to searches and seizures by state officers . . . .”).
194
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 614.
195
Id. at 616–17.
196
Id. at 620.
197
Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.10 (referring to 49 C.F.R. § 40 as
governing the privacy and confidentiality of the proposed testing). 49 C.F.R. § 40.321
prohibits employers from releasing an employee’s test results without his written
consent—adopting this aspect of the DOT regulations demonstrates that California’s
primary motivation in implementing the PPSA is a special need, not regular criminal
evidence gathering. 49 C.F.R. § 40.321 (2016).
198
See Acton, 515 U.S. at 660.
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well as the hard-to-monitor drug-filled environment in which they
work. To begin with, there is one common thread uniting HCWs, U.S.
Customs officers, and railroad employees that weighs heavily in favor
of the permissibility of testing HCWs: the safety-sensitive nature of the
professionals’ duties. The Skinner Court acknowledged the danger
accompanying drug and/or alcohol use by the general population, but
went on to state, “it is a separate and far more dangerous wrong to
perform certain sensitive tasks while under the influence of those
substances.”199 An inebriated train operator can derail a train and
cause multiple fatalities. An impaired and armed U.S. Customs official
in an airport can fire at a civilian, or an addicted officer can fall prey
to bribery by a drug smuggler and endanger our safety by introducing
more contraband into our country. The threat posed by a drugged
HCW, while dangerous on a smaller scale, is more immediate and
arguably more likely than the threats posed by the aforementioned
professionals, since the health and safety of the patient is more
proximately linked to the actions of the HCW—and some courts have
held just that.
In Kemp v. Claiborne County Hospital, the Southern District of
Mississippi found the drug testing of a scrub nurse reasonable because
of the direct risks she posed to her patients.200 The Kemp court focused
on the safety-sensitive nature of the nurse’s job and found “the
‘immediacy’ of the threat posed to the public” by the impaired
employee to be “[t]he most salient factor.”201 Thus, although it would
be rare for a drunk HCW to endanger the lives of multiple people,202 it
is undeniable that a HCW poses a more immediate and more likely
threat to his patient when operating under the influence than the
threat posed by a train conductor.
In a case out of the Northern District of California, American
Federation of Government Employees L-2110 v. Derwinski, the district court
upheld the random testing policy implemented by the Veteran’s
Association Hospital due to “the possibility of catastrophic accident”
that accompanies direct patient contact.203 The plaintiff HCWs who
sued to enjoin the testing program included a Clinical Specialist
199

Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633.
Kemp v. Claiborne Cty. Hosp., 763 F. Supp. 1362, 1367, 1369 (S.D. Miss. 1991).
201
Id. at 1367 (citing Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Sullivan, 744 F. Supp. 294, 300
(D.D.C. 1990)).
202
Although it is rare that a doctor might harm more than one person at once, it
is certainly possible—should an impaired doctor fail to vaccinate a child or expose a
patient to a contagious disease, he may very well cause an epidemic.
203
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t. Emps. L-2110 v. Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. 1493, 1498 (N.D.
Cal. 1991).
200
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Pharmacist, a licensed graduate nurse, a Medical Technologist, a
physician-pathologist, and a Dialysis Unit supervisor.204 It is key that,
like the plaintiff in Kemp, some of these employees had very little
opportunity to erroneously operate on a patient or prescribe a fatal
dosage of a drug.205 Nonetheless, the Derwinski court found that all of
the plaintiffs had “active patient care responsibilities, either directly or
in the providing of necessary diagnostic or therapeutic care to
patients,” and such care, even if it amounted to only five percent of an
employee’s time, justified testing for impairment.206
Thus, the safety-sensitive nature of HCWs’ duties plainly points to
a serious government interest in testing: while the threatened danger
to a patient depends on the type of medicine involved and the level of
direct patient contact, HCWs can endanger a life by providing any kind
of care to patients. Moreover, while U.S. Customs officials and railroad
employees may often work in small groups, a doctor usually tends to a
patient on a one-on-one basis, save for a nurse, decreasing the chance
of a third party stepping in to prevent or correct his erratic behavior
or poor judgment. Consequently, based on case law pertaining to drug
testing HCWs, as well as a comparison of the threats HCWs and the
tested employees in the Skinner-Von Raab line of cases pose, it is
irrefutable that medical professionals occupy a safety-sensitive
occupation.
A second factor that weighs in favor of the government interest in
drug testing HCWs is the importance of the interest itself—ensuring
patient safety by deterring the use of drugs and/or alcohol at work,
and ascertaining and eliminating the causes of medical error.207
Because an HCW’s professional objective is to affect the condition of a
patient’s body, it is not difficult to imagine how an inebriated HCW
could harm a patient due to a lapse in judgment. For example, a
204

Id. at 1495–97.
Id. at 1496–97 (noting that a nurse, Medical Technologist, and Dialysis Unit
supervisor infrequently have contact with patients).
206
Id. at 1496, 1498 (holding that a nurse was lawfully subject to testing even
though she had no access to narcotic drugs, did not handle surgical instruments, and
“devote[d] only five percent or less of her time to patient care,” because that fraction
of time was “significant . . . considering the importance of the care then rendered”).
Hence, the court seemed to adopt the majority’s position in Skinner that certain duties
are so dangerous “that even a momentary lapse of attention can have disastrous
consequences.” Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 628 (1989).
207
Prop. 46: Drug and Alcohol Testing of Doctors; Medical Negligence Lawsuits; Initiative
Statute, SEC’Y OF STATE OF CAL., http://vigarchive.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/en/
propositions/46/arguments-rebuttals.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
These
motivations, then, are very similar to the government interests advanced in Skinner. See
discussion supra Part IV.A.1.
205
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drunken doctor could leave in the middle of an open-heart surgery to
go out to lunch, or could badly err in delivering a baby, rendering the
birthing mother a quadriplegic.208 The data and reports of impaired
HCWs209 demonstrate that the interest in testing is not merely
“symbolic,” like Georgia’s interest in Chandler, but rather is a concrete
problem that needs a solution.210
The Acton Court upheld the testing of student athletes because
athletes who are impaired while playing a sport may harm a teammate
or opponent—certainly the concern that a HCW, wielding surgical
tools or a prescription pad, will harm a patient under his care is just as
strong as the fear that a high soccer player will run into a teammate on
the field.211 Further, the Derwinski court recognized the interest in
testing hospital employees as ensuring the integrity of the workers and
enhancing public safety.212 The district court held that maintaining the
integrity of the medical profession is “of compelling concern” because
hospitals “exist for precisely [the] purpose” of ensuring the safety of
those who seek medical attention.213 The Supreme Court reached a
similar conclusion in Von Raab in finding the testing of U.S. Customs
officials necessary to ensure the officers’ commitment to the mission
at hand.214 Thus, while this interest may seem to mirror Chandler’s
symbolic interest, the gravity of the duties performed distinguishes the
interest in upholding a doctor’s ethical obligation to remain sober
208

Press Release, Consumer Watchdog, Consumer Watchdog Campaign:
California Ballot Initiative Will Enact Nation’s First Law Requiring Random Drug
Testing of Physicians (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/
newsrelease/consumer-watchdog-campaign-california-ballot-initiative-will-enactnation’s-first-law-re. The patient who was left on the operating table while his drunken
doctor stepped out for lunch is in a permanent vegetative state as a result of his
physician’s negligence. Id. The patient whose intoxicated doctor used forceps in her
delivery is paralyzed from the neck down because her doctor “stretch[ed] her neck
and spinal cord like taffy.” Id.; see also Edward J. Boyer, Girl Wins $21 Million in
Malpractice Suit, L.A. TIMES (July 2, 1991), http://articles.latimes.com/1991-0702/local/me-1814_1_spinal-cord-injury (explaining the patient’s allegation that, after
her delivery, two other doctors “entered a conspiracy of silence” to protect the
delivering doctor despite the clear evidence of his negligence and instead told her
family that she “had a hereditary disease and would die in a few months”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
209
See discussion supra Part III.
210
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997) (stating that while there need not
be a documented problem of substance abuse among the employees at issue, such a
finding helps “shore up” the need for government involvement).
211
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662 (1995).
212
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t. Emps. L-2110 v. Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. 1493, 1498 (N.D.
Cal. 1991).
213
Id.
214
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670 (1989).
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while treating a patient from a mere desire to show a commitment to
a drug-free workplace.
Finally, the government interest in testing HCWs is particularly
strong because of the nature of the HCWs’ work environment. The
Von Raab Court noted that Customs officials are on the front lines of
drug interdiction, so an impaired or addicted employee may be
seduced by the sizeable stash of drugs under his control.215 This
concern also applies to HCWs, who have access to an abundance of
addictive drugs. The proximity to drugs is certainly a temptation to
overwhelmed HCWs, and only seems to enable addictions and provide
breeding grounds for medical negligence.216 In fact, the Derwinski
court took note of the fact that, like U.S. Customs agents, medical
employees work in a unique environment with its own temptations,
and held that “[t]he propinquity to drugs is therefore a factor to be
weighed in the balance.”217 Consequently, based on the demonstrated
problem of drug- and alcohol-impaired HCWs causing harm to
patients, the special responsibilities these professionals carry out, and
the unique environment in which they work, states have a significant
interest in testing HCWs.
2. The Efficacy of the Testing Program and the Character
of the Intrusion
Two other factors that a state must prove before it can drug test
HCWs are how effective a testing program will be in uncovering and
deterring drug and alcohol use among medical employees, and how
minimally the program will infringe upon the privacy of medical
professionals.
Based on the evidence noting the high rate of drug and alcohol
abuse among HCWs and the “culture of silence” permeating the
medical field,218 to effectively address a state’s interest in protecting
patients, a drug testing program is clearly necessary. First, there is a
documented problem of substance abuse among HCWs nationwide.219
215

Id. at 668–69.
Berge et al., supra note 39, at 625 (describing a five-year study of doctors in
physician health programs, which revealed that one of the contributing factors to
physician drug use is the “ready access to narcotics and other psychotropic drugs in
the workplace”).
217
Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. at 1499.
218
See discussion supra Part III.
219
Eisler, supra note 40 (citing a 2007 report by U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental
Health Services Administration, which stated that “an average of 103,000 doctors,
nurses, medical technicians and health care aides a year were abusing or dependent
on illicit drugs”).
216
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In upholding the railroad’s testing program, the Skinner Court noted
the problem of drug and alcohol use by railroad employees.220
Likewise, the Acton Court opined that the school’s program was
appropriately tailored to address its drug problem because the
individuals to be tested were the “leaders of the drug culture.”221 Thus,
although proof of a demonstrated substance abuse problem is not a
necessary predicate for testing,222 the presence of such a problem
among HCWs reveals the need for some sort of government
involvement to protect third parties.
Both the PPSA and the original HB-597 pushed for random drug
testing to deter drug and alcohol use among HCWs, and to ascertain
the source of medical error due to such impairment.223 But the two
acts differed in their breadth. For example, the PPSA aimed to
randomly drug test all “physicians” with admitting privileges at a
hospital, whether that physician was an employee or independent
contractor and regardless of his specific area of medicine.224 On the
other hand, the original New Hampshire bill was even broader than
the PPSA because it aimed to tie the state licensure of health care
facilities to their creation of a mandatory random drug testing
program: if the facility did not test each worker at least four times per
year, its license would be suspended.225 Because HB-597 was enacted
in response to the drug diversion of a medical technician as opposed
to a physician, the act would have tested all workers and not just certain
physicians.226 Hence, although the empirical data cited above227 seems
to apply more to doctors, the model testing policy cannot be so limited
because the Mr. Kwiatkowskis of the world can harm patients just as
much as the Dr. Duntschs.
Secondly, in upholding the U.S. Customs Service’s policy, the Von
Raab Court emphasized that Customs officials were our nation’s “first
line of defense” against the introduction of contraband into the
country.228 To some degree, then, the Court found it important that
the public relied on Customs officials to protect the country’s borders,
which made it reasonable to ensure (by testing) that the employees

220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228

Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 607–08 (1989).
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649 (1995).
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997).
Proposition 46, supra note 10; HB-597, supra note 5.
Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 §§ 2350.15(e), 2350.25(a)(1).
Abramson et al., supra note 6, at 13.
Id.
See discussion supra Part III.
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989).
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possessed their full faculties while carrying out their duties.229 In the
same sense, HCWs owe their patients those same fiduciary duties—
members of the public rely on medical professionals to take care of
their mental and physical well being, such that it is reasonable to
randomly test HCWs to ensure their sobriety.
Further, the seriousness of the work HCWs perform warrants
departure from the requirement of individualized suspicion to test
them. The Skinner Court held that, as to railroad employees, requiring
an employer to prove an individualized suspicion following an adverse
event would impede his ability to ascertain the cause of the accident
and quickly remove the impaired employees responsible.230 Moreover,
the Court held that it would be reasonable to randomly test because it
provides a more effective deterrent among the employees.231 For the
same reasons, randomly testing HCWs is an effective way to deter drug
and alcohol use, and to protect patients by discovering and removing
impaired medical employees.
Allowing suspicionless drug testing in the medical profession is
not only wise in theory, it is also warranted based on the culture of the
field today. Many advocates in the medical field have spoken out about
the need for suspicionless testing based on their personal experiences
with substance abuse or with addicted colleagues.232 For example, Dr.
Stephen Loyd, a doctor of internal medicine practicing in Tennessee,
has revealed that although he was heavily addicted to narcotics while
practicing—taking up to 100 pills a day—none of his colleagues ever
reported him or intervened despite his erratic behavior and decreased
work quality.233 Similarly, an article published by the Mayo Foundation
acknowledges the difficulty in getting help for doctors, even though
their rate of substance abuse is equal to, if not greater than, the rate of
abuse among the general population, because “a physician’s family
members and coworkers will often participate in a ‘conspiracy of
229

Id. at 670.
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 630–31 (1989).
231
Id. at 630.
232
See Consumer Watchdog, supra note 37; see also Levinson & Broadhust, supra
note 87; Julius Cuong Pham et al., Identification of Physician Impairment, JAMA, May
2013, at 2101, 2101 (suggesting the use of random testing in a model regulation for
physician impairment); Julius Cuong Pham & Peter J. Provonost, California’s Proposition
46: A Wolf in Sheep’s Wool, ANNALS INTERNAL MED., Sept. 30, 2014, at 913, 913
(explaining that a key principle of a program for physician drug testing includes
random testing); Ken Murray, Opinion, How to Deal with Doctors Who Get Drunk and High
on the Job, TIME (June 19, 2014), http://time.com/2901422/doctors-drunk-high/
(calling for mandatory testing because “patient safety concerns justify such testing for
physicians”).
233
Eisler, supra note 40.
230
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silence’ in an effort to protect the family or practice workers from
economic ruin by the loss of the physician’s job and income.”234 It is
quite plain, then, that the unwillingness to report a HCW is not limited
to Dr. Loyd and his colleagues, but medical employees across the
country.235
Moreover, a doctor’s office or hospital surely fits within the nontraditional office environment discussed in Von Raab.236 For instance,
doctors mostly work alone or with only one other medical professional
when treating a patient.237 Further, HCWs as a class frequently work
for lengthy periods of time, so their colleagues might misinterpret
signs of impairment as signs of fatigue. The ambiguity of the indicators
of substance use, the infrequent contact with other colleagues, and the
culture of silence within the medical profession all point to the
impracticability of relying on this atypical work environment to garner
an individualized suspicion of impairment on the job. As such, a
testing policy that aims to eradicate and deter drug use among HCWs
must feature random testing.
Finally, the state must prove the efficacy of the chosen testing
procedure and demonstrate that its invasiveness is justified given the
state’s interest in testing. The Skinner Court noted that while blood,
breath, and urine tests are all physical intrusions of the body, they are
negligible because they: mirror the testing done during a visit to the
doctor’s office; reveal nothing more than the presence of drugs and/
or alcohol; and can be done with minimal embarrassment or
inconvenience.238
Further, the American Society of Addiction
Medicine reports that urine testing is the most common form of drug
testing because it is the most familiar, the least expensive to analyze,
and can include a range of drugs on a test panel, while breath testing
is the standard means for testing a person for alcohol impairment.239
Moreover, the program set forth in the PPSA followed the FAA
drug testing guidelines, which courts have upheld as posing a minimal
234

Berge et al., supra note 39, at 625.
See discussion supra Part III.
236
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989).
237
Elbein, supra note 84 (explaining that, even though Baylor Regional Medical
Center of Plano suspended Dr. Duntsch after another surgeon witnessed his mishaps
in the operating room, requiring him to be monitored when performing surgeries, Dr.
Duntsch operated on Kellie Martin alone because the operation “was supposed to be
a simple procedure” that a doctor would ordinarily perform alone).
238
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 625–27 (1989).
239
See WRITING COMM., AM. SOC’Y ADDICTION MED., DRUG TESTING: A WHITE PAPER
OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF ADDICTION MEDICINE (ASAM) 23, 26 (2013),
http://www.asam.org/docs/default-source/publicy-policy-statements/drug-testing-awhite-paper-by-asam.pdf.
235
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threat of intrusiveness.240 The guidelines do not require direct
observation of the employee providing the sample—typically, the
testing atmosphere mirrors the public bathroom experience or an
annual physical examination.241 Such an environment presents a
“negligible” invasion of privacy according to the Acton Court.242
Further, the FAA program does not test the urine sample for anything
but the presence of specifically enumerated drugs: opiates, marijuana,
cocaine, amphetamines, and phencyclidine.243 In the event that a urine
or breath sample indicates the presence of drugs and/or alcohol, a
second test is done to confirm the positive finding.244 Even upon
confirmation, the results are not reported to the employer until a
licensed physician has analyzed them in conjunction with medical
information provided by the employee to find a legal explanation for
any positive match.245 Finally, the results of the test are sent to the
employer alone and may not be disseminated without the employee’s
consent.246
B. The Individual Interest in Privacy
The final step in assessing the reasonableness of a testing program
is weighing the individual’s privacy interest that is threatened. As
mentioned in the Skinner-Von Raab line of cases, urinalysis and
breathalyzer tests constitute Fourth Amendment searches that invade
one’s bodily and informational privacy.247 As the Fifth Circuit noted in
Von Raab, urinating is an activity that society recognizes as private,248
and while obtaining breath samples does not require an invasion of
privacy in the same way, it could embarrass the employee and be
inconvenient.249 Further, employees have an interest in shielding their
240

Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n v. Burnley, 700 F. Supp. 1043, 1045 (N.D. Cal.

1988).
241

49 C.F.R. § 40.41(e), (f) (2016).
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995).
243
49 C.F.R. § 40.85.
244
14 C.F.R. § 120.5 (2016) (explaining that testing programs must conform to
procedures set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 40); see also 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.251 (for alcohol), 40.87
(for drugs).
245
49 C.F.R. §§ 40.97, 40.123.
246
49 C.F.R. § 40.321. This aspect also justifies the use of the special needs doctrine
in drug testing: had the results been sent to law enforcement upon a finding of drug
use, the program would not be motivated by a purpose other than ordinary law
enforcement, and the search would be unconstitutional.
247
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989).
248
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1987)
(“There are few activities in our society more personal or private than the passing of
urine.”).
249
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625.
242
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biological, physiological, and medical information from others—a
urine test could reveal information beyond just the presence of drugs,
such as whether the employee is diabetic or pregnant.250
Accordingly, while the privacy interest threatened in providing
breath and/or urine samples is not insignificant, the individuals
subject to testing, HCWs, have a diminished expectation of privacy
because their profession is heavily regulated and/or is inherently
dangerous.251 Like the railroad industry, the medical profession is
heavily regulated, although mostly at the state level.252 Doctors, for
example, cannot practice until they have completed years of schooling
and training and have acquired a state license to practice.253 Once a
physician obtains his license, he is subject to regulation by the state
medical board, which supervises licensing and disciplinary
procedures.254 For example, the California Board’s website provides
visitors with a 104-page document that describes the laws governing the
practice of medicine within the state, from general licensing to
ordering controlled substances.255 It appears, then, that the medical
field is as highly regulated as the railroad industry, leaving physicians
with a decreased expectation of privacy.
Further, in upholding the Veteran’s Association Hospital’s testing
program, the Derwinski court took a page out of Von Raab and
remarked that “[t]hose held out as medical professionals” have an
“aura of professional competence,” such that it is unlikely for such
employees to “reasonably hold the same expectation of privacy as that
entertained by a clerical worker or other nonprofessional employee in
federal service.”256 Because providing medical care is as regulated as
250

Id. at 617.
Id. at 627 (explaining that railroad employees hold a low reasonable
expectation of privacy because they are subject to a litany of governmental rules at the
federal level); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672
(1989) (opining that those working with guns and drugs should expect to be subject
to testing because of the danger inherent in their work).
252
Deborah Haas-Wilson, The Regulation of Health Care Professionals Other than
Physicians, CATO INST., http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/
regulation/1992/10/reg15n4d.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2016).
253
Requirements for Becoming a Physician, AM. MED. ASS’N, http://www.amaassn.org/ama/pub/education-careers/becoming-physician.page? (last visited Feb. 14,
2016).
254
MED. BD. OF CAL., GUIDE TO THE LAWS GOVERNING THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE BY
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS 7 (7th ed. 2013), http://www.mbc.ca.gov/About_Us/
Laws/laws_guide.pdf.
255
See id.
256
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t. Emps. L-2110 v. Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. 1493, 1499 (N.D.
Cal. 1991). The court also remarked that the grave “life and death” atmosphere in
which a physician carries out his duties necessarily means he holds “a lesser
251
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operating a train and as dangerous as handling a firearm to protect
our borders, albeit dangerous on a smaller scale in terms of potential
casualties, individuals who voluntarily choose to occupy these positions
must accept their diminished expectation of privacy.257
This analysis balancing the employee-HCW’s privacy interest
against the state’s interest in testing him for impairment demonstrates
that it would not violate the Fourth Amendment for a state to adopt a
statute mandating testing for HCWs. Specifically, the nature and
immediacy of the government’s interest, the efficacy of testing, and the
character of the intrusion all buttress the state’s interest in testing
HCWs for drugs and/or alcohol to protect the public.
VI. MODEL STATUTE: THE GUIDEPOSTS TO INCLUDE WITHIN A STATUTE
MANDATING HCW DRUG TESTING
Taking into consideration drug testing precedent, as well as
California and New Hampshire’s attempts to mandate such testing,
this Comment proposes some guideposts that a model statute should
include to ensure a constitutional, effective, and fair testing program.258
Such a statute would: specifically enumerate the chosen procedure;
include pre-employment, random, suspicion-based, adverse event,
return-to-duty, and follow-up testing; test all HCWs; provide swift
consequences that are tailored to the infraction; and provide for a
comprehensive approach to a drug-free work environment by
supporting state physician health programs, requiring medical schools
to test students and educate them on the danger of impairment, and
enacting a whistleblower law to encourage medical professionals to
refer colleagues for help.

expectation of privacy in [his] ability to provide the services necessary to perform [his]
duties.” Id. (citation omitted).
257
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) (“Somewhat like
adults who choose to participate in a closely regulated industry, students who
voluntarily participate in school athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon
normal rights and privileges, including privacy.”) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
258
See also Pham & Provonost, supra note 232 (setting forth “the key principles of a
program for physician drug testing,” which include: 1) a focus on identification and
rehabilitation rather than punishment; 2) confidentiality; 3) mandatory preemployment, pre-appointment, or pre-licensure testing; 4) random testing; 5) forcause testing, such as adverse event testing; and 6) initially limiting testing programs
to hospitals, “where the bylaws and infrastructure can support the program”).
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A. The Statute Must Delineate the Specifics
In its attempt to mandate physician drug testing, the PPSA
provided hospitals with a ready-made policy to implement.259 The
advantage of taking the initiative in this manner is the confidence that
comes with creating a constitutional testing program.260 The FAA
regulations pose a minimal threat of invading an employee’s privacy:
not only do they ensure bodily (by not requiring direct observation)
and informational (by limiting the use of the test results) privacy, but
they also provide the test administrators with little, if any, discretion in
carrying out their duties.261 In adopting the FAA guidelines, the PPSA
likewise promised physicians minimal invasiveness in implementing
the program.
On the other hand, HB-597 did not specifically provide a testing
program for employer-health care facilities, but merely mandated that
the state Commissioner of Health and Human Services establish and
implement “a mandatory random drug testing program,” leaving the
specifics up to the Commissioner himself.262
While it might be helpful to have a universal method of testing
among the state’s health care facilities, there are benefits to allowing
each facility to adopt its own procedure: the facilities can do their own
cost-benefit analyses and find economically feasible, yet effective,
plans. It is key to note, though, that if a statute mandates that facilities
adopt their own policies as opposed to providing a universal program,
it is important to define the terms that apply to all facilities (i.e., tests
must be random and must be done “X” number of times per year, etc.).
B. Forms of Suggested Testing
1. HCWs Should Be Tested Pre-Employment, Randomly,
After an Adverse Event, Upon a Reasonable Suspicion,
and After Returning to Duty from Treatment
Based on the incidence of drug and alcohol use among medical
professionals and the failure of the system’s current policy of selfregulation, drug testing is necessary to ascertain and deter drug use in
the field. Of the two proposed pieces of legislation discussed in this
Comment, only Proposition 46 set forth a testing procedure to apply

259

Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4.
Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451, 457 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the
constitutional challenge to the FAA testing program); see also discussion infra Part IV.B.
261
Bluestein, 908 F.2d at 457; see also discussion infra Part IV.
262
HB-597, supra note 5.
260
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to all hospitals throughout the state.263 Specifically, the PPSA suggested
that physicians be drug tested according to the FAA testing regulations
and cross-referenced the DOT procedures for testing employees in the
transportation sectors that are subject to federal regulation.264 The
FAA program aims to test employees pre-employment, randomly,
following an adverse event, upon a reasonable suspicion of
impairment, when an employee returns to duty, and to follow-up with
the employee’s progress once he rejoins the workforce.265
The DOT testing program is very careful about respecting
employee privacy: for example, the regulations require that the
collector of the sample not be able to link the employee with his
sample, result, or report.266 Also, under 49 C.F.R. § 40.61, test
administrators are prohibited from asking the employee to list the
medications he is currently taking.267 Section 40.41 states that the
preferred type of testing facility is a single-toilet room with a full-length
door or a multi-stall restroom that provides “substantial visual
privacy.”268 Likewise, the policy requires that breathalyzer tests be
administered in a way that provides the employee “visual and aural
privacy” from others besides the test administrator and a DOT agency
representative.269 Further, both the urinalysis and breathalyzer tests
require a confirmatory test upon a positive result for either
substance.270 Finally, the DOT procedures prohibit an employer from
releasing an employee’s results or medical information without the
latter’s “specific written consent.”271
The regulations, then, set out a minimally intrusive method of
testing by not requiring direct observation or disclosure of medical
information until a positive result is confirmed, two factors that
weighed toward a finding of constitutionality in Von Raab,272 and by
263

Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4.
49 C.F.R. § 40 (2016). While the FAA specifies its own rules for aviation
employees under 14 C.F.R. § 120, it belongs to a group of federal agencies that are
governed by the DOT and thus largely refers to the DOT’s own provisions. DOT Agency
Information, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., http://www.dot.gov/odapc/agencies (last visited
Feb. 15, 2016).
265
49 C.F.R. § 40.14(h).
266
Id. § 40.31(d).
267
Id. § 40.61(g).
268
Id. § 40.41(e), (f).
269
Id. § 40.221.
270
See id. § 40.253 for alcohol testing and id. § 40.87 for drug testing.
271
49 C.F.R. § 40.321.
272
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660 n.2 (1989).
Moreover, the DOT regulations only permit a direct observation in select instances,
such as when an employee shows intent to, or does, tamper with the sample, or is
264
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providing testing facilities similar to public restrooms, which the Acton
Court looked upon favorably.273
Similarly, the FAA regulations,274 which served as the model for
the PPSA program, require a full range of testing of all employees in
safety-sensitive positions:275 pre-employment, random, post-accident,
reasonable cause, return to duty, and follow-up testing.276 The FAA
regulations, however, have a more detailed scheme for alcohol testing
than the DOT regulations. While all safety-sensitive employees are
tested for alcohol,277 certain employees are prohibited from working
with a BAC over 0.04 and from drinking within eight hours of
performing their duties.278
In terms of sanctions, 49 C.F.R. § 40.191 provides that a failure to
“cooperate with any part of the testing process,” even failing to empty
one’s pockets, constitutes a refusal to take a test and triggers
consequences such as suspension from work.279 Specifically, 14 C.F.R.
§§ 120.11, 120.13, and 120.15 state that pilots, flight crewmembers, and
other airmen are subject to drug testing, and their refusal to test results
in a denied certificate or rating application, or license suspension or
revocation.280
Further, the FAA provides strict consequences for positive test
results. Under 14 C.F.R. § 120.111, an employee with two positive drug
test results is permanently disqualified from performing “the safetysensitive duties [he] performed prior to the second drug test.”281 If a
test result demonstrates that an employee performed such a duty while
impaired, his employer will also permanently disqualify him from that
subject to return-to-duty or follow-up testing. 49 C.F.R. § 40.67. Such an observation
is done without advance notice to the employee, ensuring the effectiveness of the
testing, unlike in Chandler, and gives collectors little discretion to require such testing
on their own. Id.; Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 326 (1997).
273
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995).
274
14 C.F.R. § 120 (2016).
275
Industry Drug and Alcohol Testing Program, FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/aam/drug
_alcohol/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
276
14 C.F.R. §§ 120.109, 120.217; see also Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 §
2350.35 (requiring random, referral, and post-adverse event testing, but stating that a
physician put on probation for impairment cannot have his license reinstated until he
“demonstrates to the Board’s satisfaction that he or she is fit to return to duty,”
suggesting the requirement of return-to-duty and follow-up testing to demonstrate
such “fitness”).
277
14 C.F.R. §§ 120.105, 120.215.
278
Id. §§ 120.19(d), 120.37(d).
279
49 C.F.R. § 40.191 (2016).
280
14 C.F.R. §§ 120.11, 120.13, 120.15.
281
Id. § 120.111.
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position.282 When an employee engages in alcohol-related misconduct,
he is immediately removed from his safety-sensitive position and
permanently disqualified following his first incident of on-duty alcohol
use or his second violation of any alcohol-related rule under 14 C.F.R.
§§ 120.19 or 120.37.283
Based on this analysis, it seems that the PPSA provided a
constitutionally reasonable test to apply to HCWs, as well as an
adequate starting point for drafting a model testing statute. The DOT
policy implements safeguards for employee privacy pursuant to the
Skinner-Von Raab line of cases, such as preferring a public restroom
atmosphere rather than direct observation,284 ensuring that the
collector does not know the employee,285 and testing solely for the
presence of drugs and alcohol.286 Further, the FAA guidelines would
adequately protect third parties from the risks posed by impaired
physicians: the strict consequences triggered when an employee is
found to be under the influence at work supply a promising deterrent
for HCWs, and the immediate removal of such an employee
satisfactorily ensures patient safety. Accordingly, although the PPSA
failed to become law, its proposed adoption of the FAA regulations for
testing physicians seems to be an appropriate fit, and the model testing
program would do well to adopt the FAA, or any other DOT-based,
drug testing regulations.
2. Random Testing Is a Necessary Component of Any
Model Testing Statute
Although this form of testing has proved most controversial,
random testing is indispensable to an effective testing program.287 The
medical field is, and has been, self-regulating,288 and a desire to remain
self-regulating is understandable because only HCWs can understand
282

Id.
Id. § 120.221.
284
Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660 n.2 (1989).
285
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626–27 (1989) (explaining that
the railroad’s test is minimally intrusive because the sample was collected “by
personnel unrelated to the railroad employer,” making it “not unlike similar
procedures encountered” when getting an annual physical).
286
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626.
287
Ejnes, supra note 19, at 912 (“Despite our professional obligation to report
impaired colleagues, we have been reluctant to do so. Thus, as advocated by others,
effective programs to detect and prevent physician impairment may require a limited
amount of mandatory drug and alcohol testing.”).
288
Pham & Provonost, supra note 232 (“Traditionally, impaired physicians are
identified through self-policing of professional norms, with impaired physicians
identifying themselves or being identified by their colleagues.”).
283
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“the complexity of medical tasks,” the nature of their work, and the
standards to which such professionals should be held.289 On the other
hand, because HCWs understand so well the stress and the years of
hard work, they may be more forgiving of their colleagues who fall prey
to addiction or even those who sometimes come to work intoxicated.290
Consequently, thirty-three percent of physicians fail to report their
colleagues,291 which is “something of an embarrassment” to the
profession and entirely unacceptable to the public.292 Further, where
physician health programs do exist, they may be less proactive than
they should be in detecting impaired physicians, which means, “by
default, that patient harm has to occur before a review process occurs,”
and often, “an overwhelming amount of data (i.e., harmed patients)
must be available before a hospital or state initiates an investigation.”293
Perhaps, then, it is time to break from the status quo and adopt
another method of regulation. While testing in other forms (based on
a random suspicion, following an adverse event, etc.) is necessary, it
would not be sufficient to ensure patient safety. For example, relying
on referrals from colleagues to test an employee is simply ineffective
due to the culture of silence in the medical field, which prevents
physicians from reporting an impaired doctor.294
Relying on a reasonable suspicion alone to test employees for
drugs and/or alcohol would be ineffective because of the discretion
inherent in such a judgment. The DOT regulations allow employers
to test upon a reasonable suspicion, which is defined as a supervisor’s
“determination based upon specific, contemporaneous, articulable
observations concerning the employee’s appearance, behavior,
speech, or body [odors]” that lead him to believe the employee is
under the influence of drugs or alcohol.295 Because this type of testing
depends on the supervisor’s determination, influenced by his meager
two hours of training (sixty minutes of training each for the indicators

289

Matthew K. Wynia, The Role of Professionalism and Self-Regulation in Detecting
Impaired or Incompetent Physicians, JAMA, July 14, 2010, at 210, 210.
290
Pham & Provonost, supra note 232, at 913–14 (“Physicians are often reticent to
identify their colleagues, even in the face of clear evidence of impairment or abuse.”).
291
Cynthia A. Lien, A Need to Establish Programs to Detect and Prevent Drug Diversion,
MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS, July 2012, at 607, 607.
292
Abramson et al., supra note 6, at 12 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
293
Pham et al., supra note 232, at 2101.
294
Pham & Provonost, supra note 232, 913–14.
295
OFFICE OF DRUG AND ALCOHOL POLICY AND COMPLIANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.,
DOT AGENCY/USCG DRUG AND ALCOHOL PROGRAM FACTS 5, http://www.dot.gov/
sites/dot.dev/files/docs/ODAPC_Program%20Facts.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
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of alcohol use and drug use),296 it is largely discretionary. If the
supervisor chooses to turn a blind eye or misses a sign of impairment,
the employee simply will not be tested under this program.297
For example, most of the facilities that employed Kwiatkowski had
suspicion-based testing policies: at least one of them, the University of
Pittsburgh Medical Center, actually tested Kwiatkowski, but still did not
inform the ultimate authority responsible for his licensure, the
ARRT.298 On the other hand, New Hampshire’s Exeter Hospital never
tested Kwiatkowski, even though his colleagues repeatedly told
supervisors that he seemed “overly medicated” and was seen with white
foam around his mouth.299 Instead, the extent of the hospital’s
disciplinary action was sending him home for the day and recording
these behaviors in his personnel file.300
Pre-employment testing alone will not suffice to deter medical
professionals from substance abuse because they will anticipate the
test. Such tests condition a HCW’s employment on a negative drug
test, giving the prospective employees notice and an opportunity to
find a way to avoid detection. Employees could abstain from their drug
or alcohol use for the necessary period of time to allow the substance
to leave their system,301 dilute their urine and/or use the urine of
another individual, or use a product available on the market to assure
a negative result.302 While such testing at least weeds out the employees
296

KUO & ASSOCS., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., REASONABLE SUSPICION REFERRAL FOR
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING: A TRAINING PROGRAM FOR TRANSIT SUPERVISORS 3 (1997),
http://transit-safety.volpe.dot.gov/publications/safety/ReasonableSuspicion/
PDF/rf-leader.pdf.
297
Abramson et al., supra note 6, at 14; see also Roger S. Cicala, Substance Abuse
Among Physicians: What You Need to Know, HOSP. PHYSICIAN, July 2003, at 39, 42–43,
http://www.turner-white.com/pdf/hp_jul03_know.pdf
(explaining
that
the
indicators of substance abuse among HCWs vary based on the substance abused: if the
HCW has access to the drug through work, he maintains his work performance at a
high level so as to stay near the drug, but works alone, taking frequent bathroom
breaks and often closing doors to the rooms he occupies; conversely, the HCW who
abuses drugs obtained through other avenues will make work his last priority, leaving
early, coming in late, and taking extended lunch hours).
298
Abramson et al., supra note 6, at 11.
299
Id. at 12 (quotation marks omitted).
300
Id.
301
Approximate Detection Times, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayomedical
laboratories.com/articles/drug-book/viewall.html (last updated Nov. 2015). Based
on this chart, it is possible for an employee to avoid detection by abstaining from drug
use for a short time before the urinalysis: for example, cocaine and LSD leave the
system in less than one day. Id.
302
Medical School Drug Testing is a Moral and Scientific Failure, KEVINMD (May 11,
2014), http://www.kevinmd.com/blog/2014/05/medical-school-drug-testing-moralscientific-failure.html.
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who are so addicted that they cannot even abstain for a test that they
know is coming, the data regarding currently practicing impaired
medical workers303 suggests that pre-employment testing does not
capture enough of the harm-doers.
Testing following an adverse event, by definition, means waiting
until a patient is injured before stepping in to protect patients more
generally. For example, the California Health and Safety Code
includes within its definition of “adverse event”: performing surgery on
the wrong patient; death or disability associated with using a device in
patient care in a way it is not intended to be used; and death or
disability associated with giving a patient the wrong dosage of a drug.304
Another disadvantage of relying solely on adverse event testing is the
danger of a false positive—a doctor may have had a drink at a social
function after rendering his services, or a nurse may be unable to
provide a sample because he has left for vacation. Will either of these
professionals be penalized for their post-work activities, the doctor for
his positive breathalyzer test or the nurse for his “refusal” to provide a
test sample? If so, would medical professionals be forced to schedule
work around their social plans to avoid being caught in such a
predicament?305
Finally, return-to-duty and follow-up testing are necessary because
they take place after an employee has already failed or refused to take
a prior test.306 Unfortunately, because these tests are not administered
until after an employee has already violated the testing regulations
(either by failing a test or by being noncompliant), they do not have as
much of a deterrent or preventative-measure value as random testing.
Based on an analysis of the range of testing available, random
testing provides a different kind of benefit, and as such, needs to be

303

See discussion supra Part III.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1279.1(b)(1)(B), (2)(B), (4)(A) (Deering 2016);
see also Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.15(b) (adopting the definition
of “adverse event” set out in the California Health and Safety Code).
305
Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.24(A)(2) (requiring a doctor to
be tested within 12 hours of an adverse event if he treated the patient 24 hours before
the event, necessarily limiting the operative period to 36 hours); see also Levin, supra
note 14 (stating that Richard Thorp, president of the California Medical Association,
explained:
“[A]n adverse event may not come to light for days or even weeks after
a patient received care. That means that a drug test would not reveal
anything about whether the doctor in question was under the influence
while on duty. It could also be difficult for doctors to provide immediate
urine samples if they are traveling or on vacation . . . .”).
306
An Employer’s Guide to Drug Testing in Montana, MONT. DEP’T OF LABOR AND
INDUS., http://wsd.dli.mt.gov/service/drugmanuala.asp (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
304
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included in any health care testing program. Because medical
professionals have no way of knowing, down to the day, when their test
will be, they are not as prepared to avoid the test or alter their results,
offering employees an incentive to avoid using drugs or alcohol and
offering employers a more effective way to pick out the employees who
may be harming patients. Further, because there is no discretion
involved with random testing, this form of testing will presumably yield
a more accurate reading of the medical workforce because supervisors
will not be able to turn a blind eye to a positive result, and there is no
need to rely on the referrals of colleagues who prefer to not get
involved. Lastly, some have argued that random testing is an ethical
necessity because it fills in the gaps, left by other forms of testing, in a
health care institution’s ethical obligation to detect substance abusers
while avoiding the “double standards and stigmata” of suspicion-based
and pre-employment testing.307
C. All Health Care Workers Must Be Tested
Had the PPSA been enacted, it would have subjected all holders
of a physician and surgeon’s certificate to testing.308 According to the
California Business and Professions Code, a “holder” of a physician
and surgeon’s certificate may prescribe medication, use devices in or
upon a person, and/or perform surgery that would sever or penetrate
human tissue.309 Thus, even specialists in fields that generally do not
require particularly risky procedures, such as dermatologists and
podiatrists, would have been subject to testing.
Podiatrists treat a variety of foot-related problems by prescribing
drugs, setting fractures, and performing surgery.310 Some states even
license podiatrists to prescribe narcotics to treat foot conditions, to be
administered “by any route, including intravenously,” even though
“any medications prescribed may also have other systemic effects on
the patient.”311 The fact that a podiatrist is able to operate on a patient
and prescribe him medication alone creates the risk that an impaired
podiatrist can seriously harm a patient. What is more, an unlicensed
assistant at the podiatrist’s side “cannot provide any service which
constitutes the practice of podiatry” and in fact is monitored by the
307

Levine & Rennie, supra note 3, at 323.
Proposition 46, supra note 10, at sec. 4 § 2350.15(E).
309
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2051 (Deering 2016).
310
Podiatry Department: The Profession of Podiatry, BOULDER MED. CENTER,
https://www.bouldermedicalcenter.com/depts/podiatry.php (last visited Feb. 15,
2016).
311
Frequently Asked Questions, N.Y. STATE EDUC. DEP’T, OFFICE OF THE PROFS.,
http://www.op.nysed.gov/prof/pod/podfaq.htm (last updated May 12, 2015).
308
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podiatrist while in the office.312 Thus, if the podiatrist himself is under
the influence of drugs or alcohol, it seems as if the assistant will be of
little help to the patient.
Likewise, dermatologists treat skin-related problems by
prescribing medication, diagnosing certain ailments, and performing
minor surgery. For instance, when a dermatologist diagnoses skin
cancer, he may excise the “cancer and a small amount of normallooking skin” surrounding it, and typically performs the procedure
right in his office,313 putting the patient in harm’s way if the
dermatologist is impaired. Furthermore, dermatologists as a group
have generated about 86 to 123 claims of malpractice per year, ranging
from medication errors to “failure to recognize a complication of
treatment.”314
Therefore, though there is less danger to life when doctors who
do not typically perform invasive procedures—such as dermatologists
and podiatrists—err, because the nature of their practice is less
surgically demanding, the need to test these kinds of doctors is still
strong. Specialized physicians could still prescribe patients the wrong
kind of medication, or misdiagnose or fail to diagnose a serious
condition. Further, while these doctors devote a minimal percentage
of their time to procedures that can immediately impact a patient, that
small amount of time, as the Derwinski court recognized,315 is not
insignificant. Thus, a model testing policy for HCWs would include all
types of doctors.
Moreover, the ideal testing program would not be limited to
doctors because such a program would exclude nurses, medical
technicians, and other HCWs who can harm patients. Courts have
recognized this risk. In Kemp, the Southern District of Mississippi
upheld the testing of a scrub nurse because she held a safety-sensitive
position by providing “direct, hands-on patient care, including
bringing the patient from the hospital room to the operating room for
surgery and being present and assisting during surgery.”316 The district
court found that despite her not wielding a surgical instrument, a
scrub tech could cause the patient “irremediable harm” by allowing
312

Id. (internal citations omitted).
Columbus Skin Cancer Treatment, UNIVERSAL DERMATOLOGY AND VEIN CARE,
https://universaldermatology.com/medical-services/skin-cancer/ (last visited Feb.
15, 2016).
314
Patient Safety, AM. ACAD. OF DERMATOLOGY, http://www.aad.org/education/
patient-safety (last visited Feb. 15, 2016).
315
Am. Fed’n of Gov’t. Emps. L-2110 v. Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. 1493, 1498 (N.D.
Cal. 1991).
316
Kemp v. Claiborne Cty. Hosp., 763 F. Supp. 1362, 1367 (S.D. Miss. 1991).
313
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the patient to fall from a gurney, by bumping the surgeon “at a critical
moment during the surgery,” or by failing to properly count surgical
sponges.317 Similarly, the Derwinski court found the drug testing
constitutional as applied to medical professionals across the board—
physicians, pharmacists, nurses, and medical technicians—even if they
spent “five percent or less of [their] time” directly interacting with
patients.318
Finally, the cases of Mr. Kwiatkowski, Ms. Parker, and Mr.
Beumel319 make clear that nearly any employee in an operating room
or doctor’s office could harm a patient. As such, the New Hampshire
legislature was justified in proposing to test “all health care workers
employed” in state-licensed facilities.320
D. Consequences Should Be Swift, Yet Appropriate
Thanks to the public debate occasioned by Proposition 46, it has
become clear that the medical field needs to change its approach to
regulating its professionals.321 While most of the necessary reform is
beyond the scope of this Comment, it is beneficial to note some of the
suggestions made by others in the face of the failed PPSA and HB-597.
One of the biggest critiques of Proposition 46 is that it was just too
strict: many people believed that the purpose of the act was to punish,
rather than identify and rehabilitate, the impaired doctors.322 While
our instinct may be to lock up dangerous doctors, such an approach
may actually have the opposite effect on patient safety by feeding into
the culture of silence—if doctors face harsh consequences, colleagues
317

Id. at 1367–68.
Derwinski, 777 F. Supp. at 1498.
319
Levinson & Broadhust, supra note 87.
320
HB-597, supra note 5.
321
Although medicine is a self-regulating profession, relying on state medical
boards to license and discipline physicians, colleagues are mum when it comes to
blowing the whistle, and bureaucratic boards are slow to move their feet. See John
Leifer, Who Is Protecting Us from Bad Doctors?, THE LEIFER REPORT (Oct. 16, 2014),
http://leiferreport.com/protecting-bad-doctors/ (stating that, “according to
[Inspector General] Alan Levine, who provides oversight of the medical boards on
behalf of the United States,” many medical boards “serve the vested interest of
physicians to a far greater extent than they serve the public good” by underdisciplining physicians, if at all).
322
Pham & Provonost, supra note 232. One reason the PPSA seems more punitive
than rehabilitative is because California is one of the few states without a Physician
Health Program (PHP). See id. at 914; see also Sigrid Bathen, Doctors’ Drug Tests: A
Divisive Issue, CAPITOL WEEKLY (Oct. 19, 2014), http://capitolweekly.net/
drug-testing-doctors-prop-46-california7636/ (explaining that California’s PHP was
shut down in 2008 when audits revealed “major flaws,” such as allowing participants to
provide false urine samples to finish the program and return to practice).
318
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will be less likely to make referrals, and impaired physicians themselves
will try harder to hide their substance abuse.323
A second critique of the PPSA focuses on its lack of specificity.
The Act did not explain how doctors would be chosen for random
testing, “leaving the door open for less-than-random selection,” which
is “of particular concern given the increasingly competitive business
environment” of the medical field.324 Similarly, the PPSA stated that
doctors would be drug tested at hospitals, but did not specify whether
the hospital’s medical staff or its administration would be in charge of
testing.325 Accordingly, should a state enact a statute to test HCWs, it
should specify these details. For example, when Massachusetts General
Hospital began drug testing all members of its anesthesiology
department in 2008,326 it tested residents twice per year during their
first year of employment, and at least once per year for their second
and third years at the hospital.327 The Massachusetts hospital later
reported the program’s success in deterring drug use among its 100
employees.328 Conversely, the original HB-597 proposed to drug test
all HCWs four times per year.329 Perhaps, at least initially, a state might
aim to emulate the successful Massachusetts program, especially if
employers are concerned about the cost of administering such tests.330
A final criticism of Proposition 46, and perhaps of drug testing
physicians more generally, is the damage caused by false positives and
faulty referrals, especially in a state with a slow-moving medical
board.331 Minsker of the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern
California stated that the testing “could easily yield positive tests from
legitimately prescribed drugs” and “creates a presumption of
negligence.”332 Upon a positive test result, the state attorney general
323

Pham & Provonost, supra note 232.
Ejnes, supra note 19, at 912.
325
Id.
326
See discussion infra Part VII.
327
Abramson et al., supra note 6, at 13–14.
328
Id. at 14.
329
HB-597, supra note 5.
330
See, e.g., One State May Require Drug Tests for Hospital Workers, THE ADVISORY BD.
CO. (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.advisory.com/daily-briefing/2013/02/28/one-statemay-require-drug-tests-for-hospital-workers (explaining that Cary Cahoon, the vice
president of New Hampshire’s Association of Residential Care Homes, opposed the
original HB-597 because randomly testing his thirteen workers would cost him $5700
per year).
331
Elbein, supra note 84 (explaining that although six doctors and lawyers
complained to the Texas Medical Board about Dr. Duntsch, it took the Board over a
year to finally revoke his license—by that time, Duntsch had killed two patients and
paralyzed four through his “surgical misadventures”).
332
Levin, supra note 14.
324
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would temporarily suspend the doctor’s license pending an
investigation, during which time the physician could not practice and
his patients would not be treated.333 Moreover, “the Act d[id] not
specify a time frame for an investigation and hearing to determine
whether the physician was impaired,” potentially holding doctors in
limbo for an unreasonable amount of time.334 Finally, Richard Thorp,
president of the California Medical Association, spoke out against the
consequences of failing to submit to a test: according to the PPSA, if a
doctor does not submit to a test within the required period, he could
have his license suspended, which Thorp argues is “overreaching and
so draconian.”335
While these critiques are valid, one aspect of the PPSA with which
it is difficult to argue is the swift removal of a doctor from duty upon a
confirmed positive drug test. Through its reference to the DOT
regulations, the PPSA called for the confirmatory testing of a provided
sample and analysis by a Medical Review Officer of the sample and the
employee’s medical and prescription information to increase the
chance that the result is not a false positive.336 Adding such safeguards
would help protect doctors from the damage to their reputation of a
false positive while keeping the public safe.
E. Relying on a Drug Test Alone Is Not Enough to Ensure Patient Safety
Drug testing HCWs by itself will not keep patients safe. All a drug
test can do is identify an impaired HCW and remove him from his
duties for a period of time. But what happens when that period expires
and the still-addicted HCW is able to return to work? While such a
situation can be dangerous with any HCW, if the employee is one with
access to drugs at work, he could be returning to the most dangerous
place for him to be—a place where he can harm both himself and his
patients.337 Furthermore, if substance abuse is a result of the HCW’s
333

Ejnes, supra note 19, at 911–12.
Id.
335
Levin, supra note 14 (internal quotation marks omitted); but see Johnson, supra
note 49 (explaining that for Dr. A. Clark Gaither, who had long struggled with a
drinking problem, the temporary loss of his license was necessary to finally set him on
the path to sobriety after a failed intervention in medical school and an unsuccessful
attempt at mandatory treatment during his residency program).
336
This sort of procedure is included in 49 C.F.R. § 40.123 (2016).
337
Lauren Cox, Urine Drug Tests for Doctors? After Decades of Unchanging Addiction
Rates, Some Anesthesiology Departments Are Using Drug Testing, ABC NEWS MED. UNIT (Nov.
12, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/PainManagement/print?id
=6232694 (describing a study by the Cleveland Clinic Foundation in Ohio, which
revealed that “80 percent of anesthesiology residency training programs reported
problems with drug-impaired doctors, and an additional 19 percent reported a death
334
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self-medication for his job-induced stress, we owe it to that doctor to
provide him treatment to save his life.
For this reason, opponents emphasize the need for rehabilitation
programs, like Physician Health Programs (PHPs), through which
HCWs can receive treatment for their addiction, attend group therapy,
and be monitored when they return to work.338 Most states have PHPs,
and studies reporting the effectiveness of such programs boast success
rates as high as eighty or ninety percent.339 PHPs offer a variety of
services, such as “disease management, support, long-term monitoring
of illness and treatment efforts, advocacy, [and] help with fulfilling
reporting requirements.”340 Further, a 2008 study of 800 physicians
who had recently completed such programs found that after five years,
sixty-five percent of the subjects remained drug- and/or alcohol-free.341
For PHPs to be successful, however, they need to be confidential to
encourage professionals to both turn themselves in and/or refer their
colleagues. Without this promise of privacy, the stigma of substance
abuse will keep away HCWs who truly need treatment.342
Likewise, these types of program need to begin earlier. Medical
schools need to educate their students on the dangers of substance use
and abuse, since “[f]or many physicians, substance abuse begins early
during medical school and residency.”343 Moreover, medical schools
should test students to prevent recreational drug use from turning into
a crippling addiction. While some schools already feature testing,344
from overdose”); see also Seppala & Berge, supra note 80, at 4 (explaining the high
death rate among anesthesiologists and the recommendations that, when these
physicians return to work following treatment, they be kept out of the operating room,
where they would “have to handle on a daily basis the very drugs to which they were
addicted”).
338
Seppala & Berge, supra note 80, at 3–4.
339
Bathen, supra note 322.
340
Seppala & Berge, supra note 80, at 3.
341
SCIENTIFIC AM., supra note 88. Of course, this means that one in three doctors
relapse, suggesting that these programs either need to be revamped and/or that
employers need to more diligently monitor employees returning from PHPs. Id.
342
Bathen, supra note 322 (“All the doctors insist that [the program] must be secret
and confidential, otherwise no doctor will go into it . . . .”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
343
Marie R. Baldisseri, Impaired Healthcare Professional, 35 CRIT. CARE. MED., no. 2,
2007, at S106, S109 http://www.csam-asam.org/sites/default/files/pdf/misc/
16_article_Baldisseri_Impaired_healthcare_prof_2007.pdf.
344
See, e.g., Alcohol and Other Drug Policy, COLUM. UNIV. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS AND
SURGEONS,
http://ps.columbia.edu/education/academics/policies/alcohol-policy
(last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (requiring ten-panel drug test prior to students beginning
a clinical program); Background Check and Drug Testing, HERBERT WERTHEIM COLL. OF
MED., http://www.medicine.fiu.edu/admissions/md/background-check/index.html
(last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (explaining that all students are subject to a ten-panel drug
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more schools should adopt such procedures.345 Further, HCWs must
learn, through school or otherwise, how to identify an impaired
individual and the importance of identifying such people.346 Although
HCWs are under an obligation to report impaired colleagues, they
often fail to do so.347
Finally, the medical field needs a more protective whistleblower
law. Despite their moral, legal, and ethical obligations to report
colleagues they know to be impaired, HCWs fail to carry out that duty
because of the culture of silence and the threat to their careers of
turning in a fellow medical professional.348 If a state enacting a law to
drug test HCWs likewise adopts a statute to protect those who report
their colleagues, the testing law may be more effective.349
VII. THE DOWNSIDE OF TESTING HEALTH CARE WORKERS
While this Comment mainly focuses on the need to test medical
professionals for drugs and alcohol, there are some unintended
consequences of adopting legislation calling for such testing. Many
believe testing will drive HCWs out of the medical field, or at least limit
their practice areas, not only because of the fear of getting caught (the
intended consequence), but also because testing might: 1) make it
more dangerous to perform certain procedures; 2) make it too
expensive to practice medicine generally; 3) be degrading to medical
employees; and 4) be ineffective.

screen and alcohol test “prior to the beginning of first year classes”); Background Checks
and Drug Testing, SUNY DOWNSTATE MED. CTR., http://sls.downstate.edu/
student_affairs/CBCDT.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2016) (explaining that students
must take, and pay for, a ten-panel drug test before being enrolled in certain elective
clinics).
345
Medical schools should test their students because drug use and addiction can
begin in the school and clinical settings. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 49 (explaining
that Dr. A. Clark Gaither struggled with addiction throughout medical school and his
residency program); see also Elbein, supra note 94 (noting that Dr. Duntsch was
allegedly treated for drug abuse while a resident at the University of Tennessee).
346
See Seppala & Berge, supra note 80, at 2 (explaining that HCWs may be hesitant
to talk to and/or report a colleague because “medical schools provide little, if any,
training in how to recognize and treat addiction,” so “the vast majority of primary care
physicians are unable to recognize” the indicators of abuse and/or addiction in a
colleague).
347
Ejnes, supra note 19, at 912 (“Our efforts to date to address [impairment] have
fallen short and are for the most part reactive. Despite our professional obligation to
report impaired colleagues, we have been reluctant to do so.”).
348
Baldisseri, supra note 343, at S111.
349
Bathen, supra note 322 (explaining Dr. Gregory Skipper’s belief that a “snitch
law” is necessary to encourage physicians to report their colleagues by providing them
protection from liability).
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Some opponents claim that drug testing after an adverse event
will force HCWs out of the riskier areas of medicine. For example, will
testing lead to a decrease in aides in nursing homes or prevent a
surgeon from operating on particularly vulnerable patients? Perhaps,
but it should be noted that certain states, like California, when dealing
with deaths or injuries not caused directly by the HCW’s negligence,
limit “adverse events” to the death or injury of otherwise healthy
patients.350 Thus, it is possible that the state adopting drug testing for
HCWs already has, or will implement, these provisions in its statutes.
Another view shared by opponents is that drug testing will make
practicing medicine generally too expensive, forcing HCWs to leave
the field due to cost.351 One response to this critique is the approach
taken by Proposition 46, which would have required doctors
themselves to pay for the tests and would have increased licensing fees
to enable the state medical boards to administer the tests and
investigate allegations of substance abuse.352 While this approach
seems to put all of the cost on doctors, drug testing may decrease
medical errors, and in turn, the cost of medical malpractice
litigation,353 making these tests and fees affordable for doctors.
A third argument is that drug testing HCWs would be unethical
and degrading because of the cultural status of medical professionals
in our country and the invasion of privacy accompanying such tests.
Proponents would respond to this argument by pointing out that drug
and/or alcohol testing, whether by breath, urine, or blood tests, have
been upheld by courts for safety-sensitive employees, a class to which
HCWs belong.354 Accordingly, if the invasion of privacy does not
render the testing of teachers and pilots unreasonable,355 the same
would be true for HCWs. Likewise, if testing is not unethical for other
safety-sensitive employees, it could not be morally objectionable to test

350

See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1279.1 (Deering 2016) (recognizing
deaths and injuries resulting from “[r]etention of a foreign object,” “contamination
[that] is the result of generally detectable contaminants,” and use of a device that is
“other than as intended” as adverse events, but excluding deaths or injuries of highrisk patients, such as those: “associated with neurosurgical procedures known to
present a high risk of intravascular air embolism;” “from pulmonary or amniotic fluid
embolism, acute fatty liver of pregnancy, or cardiomyopathy;” and “resulting from selfinflicted injuries that were the reason for admission to the health facility”).
351
THE ADVISORY BD. CO., supra note 330.
352
Ejnes, supra note 19.
353
CAL. ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 26.
354
See supra Part IV.
355
Knox Cty. Educ. Ass’n v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 384 (6th Cir.
1998); Bluestein v. Skinner, 908 F.2d 451, 457–58 (9th Cir. 1990).
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medical professionals.356
Finally, opponents argue that drug testing is largely ineffective, so
those in the medical field should not be subjected to it. Such an
argument is unconvincing because the same rates of effectiveness
apply to drug testing no matter the subject of the test: if drug testing is
so flawed, why subject only certain subsets of the safety-sensitive class
of employees to testing and exempt others, like HCWs?357
Furthermore, some hospitals have instituted random drug testing for
their employees in recent years and have reported the success of these
programs.358 For instance, in 2005, Massachusetts General Hospital
began randomly testing all 100 employees of its Department of
Anesthesia and Critical Care at least twice in their first year of
residency, and at least once during their second and third years.359 The
program also randomly tested “[s]taff anesthesiologists and nurse
anesthetists . . . within six months of their biannual reappointment.”360
The Massachusetts hospital found that, “[s]ince the institution of th[e]
program, there have been no reported cases of drug abuse” in its
anesthesiology residency program.361
VIII. CONCLUSION
Based on drug testing precedent, HCWs are an appropriate class
of employees to constitutionally test for drugs and alcohol. Not only is
the government’s interest in testing HCWs significant due to the rate
of substance abuse within the profession and its safety-sensitive nature,
but these professionals also have a diminished expectation of privacy
by virtue of being in a highly regulated field. Further, the guideposts
advanced in this Comment—reflecting aspects of programs upheld by
courts, of provisions mentioned in proposed legislation, and of
suggested reforms from those within and outside of the medical field—
are minimally intrusive and respect HCWs’ privacy by keeping results
confidential and reducing the discretion administrators have in
356

Pham & Provonost, supra note 232, at 914 (“Most other professions that have
the potential to harm others already require routine testing. There is no ethical
justification for excluding physicians from such testing.”).
357
KEVINMD, supra note 302 (arguing that drug testing is not necessary because if
the objective is to prevent addicts from becoming doctors, the rigors of medical school
already accomplish that aim); but see Elbein, supra note 94 (explaining that Dr.
Duntsch abused drugs throughout medical school and went on to practice as a
neurosurgeon); see also Baldisseri, supra note 343, at S109.
358
Abramson et al., supra note 6, at 13–14.
359
Id.
360
Id. at 14.
361
Id.
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carrying out the program. While the suggested program proposes to
test all HCWs, such a broad application is warranted based on the
dangers inherent in any sort of patient treatment, no matter the
degree of actual physical contact.
Although adopting such legislation may risk some negative
consequences, such as scaring medical employees away from certain
types of procedures or making it more expensive to practice medicine
generally, the advantages of testing HCWs far outweigh the
disadvantages. For years, different sectors of society have called for the
random drug testing of medical employees, and for years, such
provisions have been put off. Despite reliance on self-regulation and
PHPs, the rate of substance abuse among HCWs is not subsiding, and
a change is necessary to protect patients. While the medical field may
have to pay the price of relinquishing some control and perhaps
expending more money to monitor professionals, the result is a
healthier and more reliable profession, and as such, greater safety for
patients.
Upon graduating medical school, doctors take the Hippocratic
Oath and swear to uphold the following statements: “[m]ost especially
must I tread with care in matters of life and death . . . . I will remember
that I remain a member of society, with special obligations to all my
fellow human beings . . . .”362 A random drug test a few times per year
can be instrumental in saving lives, and it is surely a facet of the “special
obligations” those in the health care profession hold to their fellow
human beings.

362

Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, NOVA (Mar. 27, 2001),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html.

